Members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s
Defence and Security Committee visited Washington DC and Texas from 9-12
July, 2013. The delegation consisted of 32 legislators from 19 NATO member
nations. The visit was hosted by Congressman Michael Turner, head of the US
Delegation, and was led by Defence and Security Committee Chairman Senator
Joseph A. Day (Canada). Hugh Bayley (United Kingdom), President of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly, also participated.
The delegation met senior officials from the US
Department of Defence and the State Department, military leaders, independent
experts, and managers of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The delegation
received briefings and discussed themes including the transatlantic relationship,
US defence priorities and policy, the impact of “sequestration” on defence
policy, US participation in NATO operations, the security environment in
Afghanistan, cyber security, the implications of the unconventional gas
revolution, the situation in Syria and North Africa, the roles and missions of
the US National Guard and Reserve forces, and 5th Generation US
Airpower.
In addition, President Bayley and officers of the
DSC met several Members of the US House of Representatives and Senate to discuss
the role of the NATO PA and share perspectives on the transatlantic
relationship.
The visit concluded with a visit to the Naval Air
Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth and Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter manufacturing facilities in Fort Worth, Texas.
2.United States Security and Defence
Defence planners and leaders in the US national
security community are focusing heavily on two issues: the transition in
Afghanistan and the impacts of the sequester. Jesse Kelso, Deputy
Director of NATO Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defence explained
that every organization within the Department of Defence has had to cut its
staffing by 20%. Some organizations are simply shutting down one day a week,
while others are operating short staffed and are staggering their personnel’s
furlough schedules. Lawrence Korb of the Centre for American Progress
suggested that procurement cuts will change procurement strategies, including
perhaps a Navy re-think of its F-35 purchase in favour of more F/A 18s. The
sequesters greatest impact, however, could be cuts in training and the
readiness of US forces, both of which would affect NATO.
A.Perceptions of NATO
The view was expressed that NATO currently has an
“ownership problem” with Europeans and Americans both feeling that the NATO is
“owned and more greatly influenced” by the other. American planners rarely, if
ever, take into account the impact of their work on NATO’s force structure and
capabilities. But in reality, NATO defence planning is almost entirely focused
on responding to what the United States is planning for its own defence. And
because of the confluence of an overwhelming focus on responding to the budget
pressures and the delay in the top level political appointment process, most
routine NATO work has been postponed—including groundwork for the next NATO
summit.
From the public’s view many Americans are confused
as to what the US actually “spends” directly on NATO. However, Mr. Kelso noted
that the two programs that constitute the greatest single cost of US
involvement in NATO – BMD and the life extension of the B61 warheads - would
occur regardless of how involved the US was in other Alliance activities.
At a strategic level, the transatlantic
relationship is still to a great extent about keeping the US engaged in
Europe. It is a relationship that requires reliable partners—which the
Europeans have proven to be. In fact, there has been a significant investment
in the evolution of European forces in the years since Kosovo, with
capabilities evolving from almost entirely static and conventionally defensive
to deployable and tailored to mission.
Even as the US “pivots” towards Asia, American
allies in that region are relatively limited in what they can do. And while
most allies in East Asia can operate with the US, they cannot and will not
operate with one another. The reality is that although many of the European
allies are cutting their own budgets, Europe is still the United States’ most
capable ally.
B.Middle East / Syria
The Department of Defence sees instability in the
Middle East as the “new normal.” Andrew Exum, Special Advisor for
Middle East Policy, underlined that institutionally speaking, the challenge is
that trends and situations occurring in one country can spill over or influence
events in neighbours. Ironically the well-patrolled Mediterranean Sea –
traditionally seen as a thoroughfare - currently acts as a barrier, while the
Sahara – previously all but impassable—is now acting as a great sea and a
causeway for flows of people and weapons
He reminded the group that US policy on Iran is
clear: the development of nuclear weapons capabilities is unacceptable and the
US would act to prevent this if needed. Other top priorities for the Obama
Administration include continued hydrocarbon access (not just for the US but
for the rest of the consumers of Middle East oil) and the security of Israel.
American policy makers are also concerned with
long-term stability in the Arabian Peninsula, as the inevitable transition of
Saudi leadership presents many unknowns and the Saudi economy is dominated by
hydrocarbon exports.
With regards to Syria, the ungoverned spaces on
its Lebanese and Iranian borders and the threats of chemical weapon use are the
two greatest concerns. In discussion with members, it was noted that as
elsewhere in the region, the conflict in Syria involved a sectarian component.
Indeed, Sunni-Shia relations are central to regional dynamics – and currently
these are at a low point, and Lebanon in particular seems to be at risk of bearing
the consequences.
Ambassador Richard Schmierer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs,
provided the group with an overview of the State Department’s perspective on
several challenges in the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to the
“spillage” of the Syrian civil war into Lebanon, the refugee situations in
Turkey and Jordan have become very serious. Jordan has reached the limit its
abilities to provide for refugees coming over its borders. Syrian refugees that
have dispersed into communities in Lebanon, as well as those living in
overflowing Jordanian camps, are at high risk of radicalization because of the
confluence of the lack of basic services and the engagement of radical Sunni
organizations.
In his remarks on Israel, he emphasized that
Secretary of State, John Kerry, is very focused on working towards a “two state
solution” between Israelis and Palestinians. The younger generation of leaders
in Israel and Palestine really do want an end to the conflict and the progress
of Palestinian institution building has laid the foundation for moving forward
with such a solution. Mr. Schmierer also reaffirmed the DOD perspective that
the United States is committed to ensuring that Iran will not have a nuclear
weapon. However, he mentioned that although there are no illusions regarding
Iran’s new president, there is some cause for optimism in the Iranian popular
call for moderation and potentially more constructive engagement with the rest
of the world.
C.Egypt
The United States is very engaged in trying to
manage the transition in Egypt. Diplomats are currently working with Egyptian
leaders to get the building blocks for an appropriate civilian government into
place. Specifically the US is working to keep pressure on Egyptian leadership
to continue down a democratic course rather than slipping towards
authoritarianism.
There is great concern in the US national security
community about the tumult in Egypt, according to Mr. Exum, especially the long
term challenges of economic and security sector reform. There is significant
foreign direct investment. But the cost of living has vastly outpaced average
incomes, and the cost of basic commodities has skyrocketed.
D.North Africa and Mali
Alice Friend,
Principal Director in the Office of African Affairs, reaffirmed that in North
Africa, DOD operates under an “alliance-based” strategy – no one country has
the capabilities to operate in this area alone. A lot of progress was being
made in Libya, and NATO might soon get involved in assistance with training.
While the violence in Mali has been brought under
control, it remains a substantial security challenge to everyone in NATO. Ms.
Friend commented that “now the hard part begins” and a key element will be to
encourage the political classes to reform and govern in a way that encourages
stability.
Much could be done in terms of training and
assistance with both the military and government, but the economy remained a
daunting challenge. A strong economy is more resistant to terrorism, and economic
development was the real key to Mali’s future. Professional armed forces would
indeed be vital in dealing with terrorist groups which are currently lying low,
but these were not a “silver bullet”.
3.United States Institute of Peace
The delegation was hosted by the United States
Institute of Peace for an afternoon session with US State Department
Officials. USIP President Jim Marshall outlined that the overall
mission of the organization is to “stop violent conflict.” In line with the
goals of “preventing, mitigating, and resolving international conflict through
non-violent means” USIP trains and places experts into zones of conflict in
order to support programs which mitigate its long term effects on the
population. Mr. Marshall outlined that the USIP is structured to be
non-partisan by having a diverse board of directors. And that it is currently
involved in projects in Burma, Afghanistan, Sudan and other areas of conflict
or potential instability.
Mr. Marshall mentioned a proposal to form a
“European Institute of Peace”, but noted that this had been resisted probably
due to the perception that it could interfere with the diplomatic efforts of
individual States. However, Mr. Marshall felt that Europe has a true strategic
need for stability and peace in North Africa, and that many think that a EUIP
would have a great role to play in supporting civil society programs promoting
stability in this region.
E.Afghanistan
In general, perceptions of the conflict in
Afghanistan are far more negative than the reality, stated Ambassador James
B. Warlick, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
This has led many Americans to question the continued involvement of US
military personnel and the continued resourcing of Afghan forces and government
organizations.
Mr. Warlick asserted that media coverage has
missed much of the “good news” coming from the region. He outlined several
factors, including high levels of trade at the Pakistani border, proliferation
of cell phone coverage and use, and that 40 percent of all school children are
girls, which he felt were indicators that the ISAF mission was indeed
succeeding.
The Obama Administration has laid out five
benchmarks by which it would determine the success of its efforts: building the
ANSF into a capable fighting force, transitioning from ISAF to Afghan
leadership in military and civilian operations, reconciliation with the
Taliban, building regional cooperation, and finally agreeing upon US and NATO
strategic partnerships with Afghanistan. Mr. Warlick encouraged the Members of
the DSC to also look to these key benchmarks when evaluating the success of the
ISAF mission.
The greatest near term challenges for the United
States and NATO in Afghanistan are not the current security situation, but
laying down the legal and operational framework for future cooperation. Mr.
Warlick suggested that while the Bilateral Security Agreement does not face any
insurmountable hurdles, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is much harder to
agree upon because there are simply so many details that must be written into
this binding legal document. He suggested though, that once the US’ agreement
is concluded, the NATO SOFA would be a much easier task.
Finally, Mr. Warlick acknowledged that the outcome
of the 2014 Afghan elections may, in fact, prove to be the most critical factor
which determines the shape of the country’s future. Currently there are
multiple potential candidates for President, but no indicators as to who the
front-runners might be. President Karzai, concerned about his legacy, has
taken to using foreign forces and NATO as a foil. And while NATO and its
partners will push for transparency in the 2014 elections, he suggested that it
is unlikely that foreign troops and personnel would pull out entirely, even if
the elections did not create the ideal atmosphere and Afghan government for
continued operations.
F.The Impact of the Natural Gas Revolution
The hydrocarbon market is in a state of flux and
NATO has a role to play, suggested Amos J. Hochstein, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Energy Diplomacy. Access to energy has historically
driven international conflicts, and as new sources of natural gas in North
America and off the western coast of Africa have been discovered and exploited,
there has been a geopolitical shift afoot. Not only are new hydrocarbon
producers entering the scene, but as the types of hydrocarbons being produced
shift from crude oil to natural gas, new transport actors and consumers have
developed.
On the supply side, OPEC is no longer a cartel
and, due to greater consumption by the emerging economies, it is producing at
its highest capacity. Disruption in the Middle East would have most impact on
the emerging non-OECD economies, but because hydrocarbons are traded in a
global market, the repercussions of such disruption would be felt globally.
As the United Stated becomes a hydrocarbon
exporter, this will have implications for the transatlantic relationship. For
the first time in a century, there could be a divergence in strategic interest
regarding the Middle East. According to some, American hydrocarbon
self-sufficiency could call into question the country’s commitment to the Gulf
States and the stability of the region. Others, however, suggest that Europe’s
interests may be evolving in the same direction but for a different reason. As
more fields come on line in the eastern Mediterranean, and the new pipeline
from the Caspian opens, Europe’s reliance on Middle Eastern energy supplies
will also decline.
Mr. Hochstein suggested that NATO’s main role in
these developments would be to essentially spread the risk – to maintain and
diversify hydrocarbon access for its member States. In operational terms this
means transport route security, critical infrastructure protection (not only in
NATO countries, but in production and transport locations as well), and civil
emergency planning. Finally, NATO should play a role in promoting the
development not just of alternative energy sources, but also alternative supply
chains.
Mr. Hochstein also addressed how nations should
work collaboratively to pre-emptively plan for the impact of changes in
waterway and seabed access in the High North and Arctic. Speaking specifically
about the Arctic, Mr. Hochstein suggested that there were three main areas
which would be most ripe for international policy collaboration: basic search
and rescue policies, co-operation in understanding the environmental impact of
drilling and exploration of the seabed, and broader issues of the Law of the
Sea and how it is applied to exclusive economic zones.
G.Missile Defence
The Obama Administration sees missile defence as
an integral part of maintaining extended deterrence and assurance, and there
remains wide consensus and broad support for ballistic missile defence within
the US government and Congress, even though there are differences on some
specifics.
Steve Hildreth, a
missile defence expert with the Congressional Research Service, outlined to the
delegation that within Congress and the US National Security establishment,
there are significant areas of disagreement on how missile defence should be
developed and utilized. The contours of these debates include cost,
technological focus (sensors vs. interceptors), questions of near-term need,
what capabilities are required beyond Phase 3, environmental concerns,
operational constraints, and technical constraints. Local concerns of missile
debris landing in populated areas, or in neighbouring countries such as Canada,
also play a great part in missile defence discussions.
Engagement with the Russians on missile defence
continues to be particularly challenging, as well as engagement with the
Chinese. While North Korea has yet to successfully test its long range
program, the DPRK has recently put an object into orbit, raising concerns in
this area.
Mr. Hildreth explained that in the past decade
there has developed a strong “Homeland Defence” component to missile defence.
US defence officials have recently decided to explore more effective sensors
rather than pushing for more capable interceptors. This is the more palatable
choice, as sensors are less expensive and are considered by many to provide a
greater augmentation in system capability than would improvements in
interceptors. Currently the Department of Homeland Security is looking at as
many as 25 potential candidate sites for east coast BMD.
In the United States, the missile defence budget
is not subject to the normal DOD budget oversight process. Instead, budget
decisions are made at such a high level that missile defence programs are often
less vulnerable to overall budget trends. However, sequestration will effect
missile defence testing. While technological development and procurement will
be spared, the most complicated tests will be delayed and this could ultimately
have long term effects in the speed of development of the overall program.
In response to members’ questions, Mr. Hildreth
said that the use of lasers for missile defence was currently now being
investigated by the United States Navy, and questions were increasingly being
raised about the value of dialogue with Russia on missile defence since the
Russian position seemed to be one of unwavering opposition.
H.Cyber security
No Allied government has yet successfully worked
out how to deal with the cyber domain, suggested Ian Wallace, Visiting
Fellow at the Brookings Institution. The cyber domain remains a “confused and
confusing subject,” and is most effectively understood when looked at in its
entirety, rather than just through the prism of cyber security.
One of the most problematic policy responses to
challenges in the realm of cyber is that it is often framed in terms of cyber
conflict. This causes a high risk of NATO and the Allied countries
individually framing and responding to threats in the cyber domain in an
ineffective way. If Allied Governments frame the discussion in terms of a
“cyber war” it delegates authority and action away from the general
population. Publics see war as being waged by soldiers, not citizens, which
detracts from the important things that citizens can do to reduce the cyber
threat. Framing the cyber challenge as a “war” can also lead the population to
become insensitive to the threat when they don’t personally “feel” any effects
on their daily lives.
Focusing on the idea of cyber conflict or
cyber war detracts from discussing cyber defence, Mr. Wallace suggested,
this has great implications, especially for NATO’s ability to conceptualize
future force structure. Militaries are not yet making the changes needed to
incorporate cyber as a new domain, rather than simply as a “support structure”
for conventional domains. NATO may also be losing out in failing to ensure
that nations which benefit from its training and capacity building operations
are also securing their networks in a way that do not put their NATO partners
at risk. In other words, Allies needed to be confident that the networks of
other Allies and partners are secure.
Mr. Wallace also noted that large organizations
are generally ill-equipped to deal with “disruptive innovation”. Mr. Wallace
suggested that new actors - young cyber-savvy people rather than the military -
may potentially build new alliances and new cooperative efforts in their
virtual environments. He worried that NATO has thus far failed to anticipate
this and has yet to take it into account when evaluating its future security
environment. China and India, countries that are not part of the Alliance and
are at times at odds with its goals, are laying down the greatest amount of
cyber infrastructure – infrastructure which will be used by Allied nations’
populations and even governments.
Like any other emerging domain, the internet is
currently very much an “ungoverned space,” but perhaps even more so, as
“un-governability” is coded into its very nature. However, it would be useful,
Mr. Wallace believes, to understand the impact of the security organizations of
Allied nations reaching out those on the “other end of the line.” Often these
actions tend to build relationships between security organizations, to the
detriment of civilian ones. This, in turn, frames an interpretation that cyber
is really within the purview of the defence and security agencies, and that it
is the responsibility to apply a whole-of-government approach in this domain,
whether or not it is the most effective response.
Mr. Wallace suggested that there is a significant
role for elected leaders to play in this area. As the protection of critical
infrastructure is simply not a role that NATO or even many of the national
security agencies can effectively take on, parliaments could encourage the
private sector to put this protection into place. With regards to offensive
capabilities, Mr. Wallace likened an appropriate NATO operational concept for
cyber to be something akin to the nuclear umbrella—where some States have
offensive capabilities and many others contribute infrastructure or
intelligence, without actually acting offensively.
4.Naval Air Station Fort Worth, Joint Reserve Base
The delegation travelled to Fort Worth, Texas, in
order to visit Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base, and the
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Manufacturing
Facilities.
The delegation was briefed on NAS Fort Worth JRB’s
missions and the units that make up its command. NAS Fort Worth was
established as the Navy’s first Joint Reserve Base and has been seen as a model
for future base and unit consolidations. Units operating on this base include
Navy logistics units, Air Force fighter wings, Marine Corps regiments, Army
Reserve intelligence and aviation support units, and the 136th
Airlift Wing of the Texas Air National Guard.
Over ten thousand service members are assigned to
the units at NAS Fort Worth JRB, and the base is the third largest employer in
Northern Texas, with an economic footprint of over $2 Billion USD. 76 aircraft
and unmanned systems flying over 31,000 sorties in 2012, supported missions
ranging from refuelling and ISR, to homeland defence and conventional air
superiority. In addition to the Navy, Air Force, and Air National Guard
missions, the Marine Corps units provide construction engineering support.
Colonel Ferrell,
with the Texas Air National Guard, briefed the delegation on the differences
between conventional “Title 10” forces, and “Title 32” National Guard troops.
She outlined for the group that many of the aircraft flown by the Air National
Guard are federal assets, while the personnel, depending on their mission, can
be paid for either by the federal budget or the state. Over the past decade of
conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, many Texas National Guard and Reserve
personnel have been activated for federal duty – usually attached to a regular
Army or Air Force unit.
Members were particularly impressed at the way the
United States utilizes reserve forces and the National Guard so that they can
be integrated with regular armed forces both flexibly and efficiently.
The delegation also visited the Lockheed Martin
Aeronautics Company F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Manufacturing Facilities, where
they received briefings on the F-35’s design and capabilities, participated in
flight simulator demonstrations, toured the manufacturing facility shop floor,
and viewed all three variants of the aircraft at close range. The delegation
was able to review the impressive technological innovations of this “fifth
generation” aircraft, including stealth design features such as internal fuel
tanks and ordinance carriage, streamlined engine inlets, fixed array radar, and
reduced engine nozzle signature. As the F-35 is brought on line in the air
forces of eight partner nations, Lockheed anticipates that there will be a
savings in operation and maintenance costs, as economies of scale can be utilized
to bring down the cost of parts/skilled labour. As with many alliance
projects, the potential gains in interoperability and joint international
training may prove to be most valuable asset that the F-35 brings to the table.
Respectfully submitted,
Honourable Joseph A. Day, Senator
Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (NATO PA)