

Canadian NATO
Parliamentary Association



Association parlementaire
canadienne de l'OTAN

**Report of the Canadian Parliamentary Delegation
respecting its participation to the visit of the Defence and
Security Committee (DSC)**

Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (NATO PA)

**Washington, D.C. and Dallas, Texas, United States
July 9 to 12, 2013**

Report

1. Introduction

Members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's Defence and Security Committee visited Washington DC and Texas from 9-12 July, 2013. The delegation consisted of 32 legislators from 19 NATO member nations. The visit was hosted by Congressman Michael Turner, head of the US Delegation, and was led by Defence and Security Committee Chairman Senator Joseph A. Day (Canada). Hugh Bayley (United Kingdom), President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, also participated.

The delegation met senior officials from the US Department of Defence and the State Department, military leaders, independent experts, and managers of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The delegation received briefings and discussed themes including the transatlantic relationship, US defence priorities and policy, the impact of "sequestration" on defence policy, US participation in NATO operations, the security environment in Afghanistan, cyber security, the implications of the unconventional gas revolution, the situation in Syria and North Africa, the roles and missions of the US National Guard and Reserve forces, and 5th Generation US Airpower.

In addition, President Bayley and officers of the DSC met several Members of the US House of Representatives and Senate to discuss the role of the NATO PA and share perspectives on the transatlantic relationship.

The visit concluded with a visit to the Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth and Lockheed Martin's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter manufacturing facilities in Fort Worth, Texas.

2. United States Security and Defence

Defence planners and leaders in the US national security community are focusing heavily on two issues: the transition in Afghanistan and the impacts of the sequester. **Jesse Kelso**, Deputy Director of NATO Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defence explained that every organization within the Department of Defence has had to cut its staffing by 20%. Some organizations are simply shutting down one day a week, while others are operating short staffed and are staggering their personnel's furlough schedules. **Lawrence Korb** of the Centre for American Progress suggested that procurement cuts will change procurement strategies, including perhaps a Navy re-think of its F-35 purchase in favour of more F/A 18s. The sequesters greatest impact, however, could be cuts in training and the readiness of US forces, both of which would affect NATO.

A. Perceptions of NATO

The view was expressed that NATO currently has an "ownership problem" with Europeans and Americans both feeling that the NATO is "owned and more greatly influenced" by the other. American planners rarely, if ever, take into account the impact of their work on NATO's force structure and capabilities. But in reality, NATO defence planning is almost entirely focused on responding to what the United States is planning for its own defence. And because of the confluence of an overwhelming focus on responding to the budget

pressures and the delay in the top level political appointment process, most routine NATO work has been postponed—including groundwork for the next NATO summit.

From the public's view many Americans are confused as to what the US actually "spends" directly on NATO. However, Mr. Kelso noted that the two programs that constitute the greatest single cost of US involvement in NATO – BMD and the life extension of the B61 warheads - would occur regardless of how involved the US was in other Alliance activities.

At a strategic level, the transatlantic relationship is still to a great extent about keeping the US engaged in Europe. It is a relationship that requires reliable partners—which the Europeans have proven to be. In fact, there has been a significant investment in the evolution of European forces in the years since Kosovo, with capabilities evolving from almost entirely static and conventionally defensive to deployable and tailored to mission.

Even as the US "pivots" towards Asia, American allies in that region are relatively limited in what they can do. And while most allies in East Asia can operate with the US, they cannot and will not operate with one another. The reality is that although many of the European allies are cutting their own budgets, Europe is still the United States' most capable ally.

B. Middle East / Syria

The Department of Defence sees instability in the Middle East as the "new normal." **Andrew Exum**, Special Advisor for Middle East Policy, underlined that institutionally speaking, the challenge is that trends and situations occurring in one country can spill over or influence events in neighbours. Ironically the well-patrolled Mediterranean Sea – traditionally seen as a thoroughfare - currently acts as a barrier, while the Sahara – previously all but impassable—is now acting as a great sea and a causeway for flows of people and weapons

He reminded the group that US policy on Iran is clear: the development of nuclear weapons capabilities is unacceptable and the US would act to prevent this if needed. Other top priorities for the Obama Administration include continued hydrocarbon access (not just for the US but for the rest of the consumers of Middle East oil) and the security of Israel.

American policy makers are also concerned with long-term stability in the Arabian Peninsula, as the inevitable transition of Saudi leadership presents many unknowns and the Saudi economy is dominated by hydrocarbon exports.

With regards to Syria, the ungoverned spaces on its Lebanese and Iranian borders and the threats of chemical weapon use are the two greatest concerns. In discussion with members, it was noted that as elsewhere in the region, the conflict in Syria involved a sectarian component. Indeed, Sunni-Shia relations are central to regional dynamics – and currently these are at a low point, and Lebanon in particular seems to be at risk of bearing the consequences.

Ambassador Richard Schmierer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, provided the group with an overview of the State Department's perspective on several challenges in the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to the "spillage" of the Syrian civil war into Lebanon, the refugee situations in Turkey and Jordan have become very serious. Jordan has reached the limit its abilities to provide for refugees coming over

its borders. Syrian refugees that have dispersed into communities in Lebanon, as well as those living in overflowing Jordanian camps, are at high risk of radicalization because of the confluence of the lack of basic services and the engagement of radical Sunni organizations.

In his remarks on Israel, he emphasized that Secretary of State, John Kerry, is very focused on working towards a “two state solution” between Israelis and Palestinians. The younger generation of leaders in Israel and Palestine really do want an end to the conflict and the progress of Palestinian institution building has laid the foundation for moving forward with such a solution. Mr. Schmierer also reaffirmed the DOD perspective that the United States is committed to ensuring that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon. However, he mentioned that although there are no illusions regarding Iran’s new president, there is some cause for optimism in the Iranian popular call for moderation and potentially more constructive engagement with the rest of the world.

C. Egypt

The United States is very engaged in trying to manage the transition in Egypt. Diplomats are currently working with Egyptian leaders to get the building blocks for an appropriate civilian government into place. Specifically the US is working to keep pressure on Egyptian leadership to continue down a democratic course rather than slipping towards authoritarianism.

There is great concern in the US national security community about the tumult in Egypt, according to Mr. Exum, especially the long term challenges of economic and security sector reform. There is significant foreign direct investment. But the cost of living has vastly outpaced average incomes, and the cost of basic commodities has skyrocketed.

D. North Africa and Mali

Alice Friend, Principal Director in the Office of African Affairs, reaffirmed that in North Africa, DOD operates under an “alliance-based” strategy – no one country has the capabilities to operate in this area alone. A lot of progress was being made in Libya, and NATO might soon get involved in assistance with training.

While the violence in Mali has been brought under control, it remains a substantial security challenge to everyone in NATO. Ms. Friend commented that “now the hard part begins” and a key element will be to encourage the political classes to reform and govern in a way that encourages stability.

Much could be done in terms of training and assistance with both the military and government, but the economy remained a daunting challenge. A strong economy is more resistant to terrorism, and economic development was the real key to Mali’s future. Professional armed forces would indeed be vital in dealing with terrorist groups which are currently lying low, but these were not a “silver bullet”.

3. United States Institute of Peace

The delegation was hosted by the United States Institute of Peace for an afternoon session with US State Department Officials. USIP President **Jim Marshall** outlined that

the overall mission of the organization is to “stop violent conflict.” In line with the goals of “preventing, mitigating, and resolving international conflict through non-violent means” USIP trains and places experts into zones of conflict in order to support programs which mitigate its long term effects on the population. Mr. Marshall outlined that the USIP is structured to be non-partisan by having a diverse board of directors. And that it is currently involved in projects in Burma, Afghanistan, Sudan and other areas of conflict or potential instability.

Mr. Marshall mentioned a proposal to form a “European Institute of Peace”, but noted that this had been resisted probably due to the perception that it could interfere with the diplomatic efforts of individual States. However, Mr. Marshall felt that Europe has a true strategic need for stability and peace in North Africa, and that many think that a EUIP would have a great role to play in supporting civil society programs promoting stability in this region.

A. Afghanistan

In general, perceptions of the conflict in Afghanistan are far more negative than the reality, stated **Ambassador James B. Warlick**, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. This has led many Americans to question the continued involvement of US military personnel and the continued resourcing of Afghan forces and government organizations.

Mr. Warlick asserted that media coverage has missed much of the “good news” coming from the region. He outlined several factors, including high levels of trade at the Pakistani border, proliferation of cell phone coverage and use, and that 40 percent of all school children are girls, which he felt were indicators that the ISAF mission was indeed succeeding.

The Obama Administration has laid out five benchmarks by which it would determine the success of its efforts: building the ANSF into a capable fighting force, transitioning from ISAF to Afghan leadership in military and civilian operations, reconciliation with the Taliban, building regional cooperation, and finally agreeing upon US and NATO strategic partnerships with Afghanistan. Mr. Warlick encouraged the Members of the DSC to also look to these key benchmarks when evaluating the success of the ISAF mission.

The greatest near term challenges for the United States and NATO in Afghanistan are not the current security situation, but laying down the legal and operational framework for future cooperation. Mr. Warlick suggested that while the Bilateral Security Agreement does not face any insurmountable hurdles, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is much harder to agree upon because there are simply so many details that must be written into this binding legal document. He suggested though, that once the US’ agreement is concluded, the NATO SOFA would be a much easier task.

Finally, Mr. Warlick acknowledged that the outcome of the 2014 Afghan elections may, in fact, prove to be the most critical factor which determines the shape of the country’s future. Currently there are multiple potential candidates for President, but no indicators as to who the front-runners might be. President Karzai, concerned about his legacy, has taken to using foreign forces and NATO as a foil. And while NATO and its partners will push for transparency in the 2014 elections, he suggested that it is unlikely that foreign troops and

personnel would pull out entirely, even if the elections did not create the ideal atmosphere and Afghan government for continued operations.

B. The Impact of the Natural Gas Revolution

The hydrocarbon market is in a state of flux and NATO has a role to play, suggested **Amos J. Hochstein**, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy Diplomacy. Access to energy has historically driven international conflicts, and as new sources of natural gas in North America and off the western coast of Africa have been discovered and exploited, there has been a geopolitical shift afoot. Not only are new hydrocarbon producers entering the scene, but as the types of hydrocarbons being produced shift from crude oil to natural gas, new transport actors and consumers have developed.

On the supply side, OPEC is no longer a cartel and, due to greater consumption by the emerging economies, it is producing at its highest capacity. Disruption in the Middle East would have most impact on the emerging non-OECD economies, but because hydrocarbons are traded in a global market, the repercussions of such disruption would be felt globally.

As the United States becomes a hydrocarbon exporter, this will have implications for the transatlantic relationship. For the first time in a century, there could be a divergence in strategic interest regarding the Middle East. According to some, American hydrocarbon self-sufficiency could call into question the country's commitment to the Gulf States and the stability of the region. Others, however, suggest that Europe's interests may be evolving in the same direction but for a different reason. As more fields come on line in the eastern Mediterranean, and the new pipeline from the Caspian opens, Europe's reliance on Middle Eastern energy supplies will also decline.

Mr. Hochstein suggested that NATO's main role in these developments would be to essentially spread the risk – to maintain and diversify hydrocarbon access for its member States. In operational terms this means transport route security, critical infrastructure protection (not only in NATO countries, but in production and transport locations as well), and civil emergency planning. Finally, NATO should play a role in promoting the development not just of alternative energy sources, but also alternative supply chains.

Mr. Hochstein also addressed how nations should work collaboratively to pre-emptively plan for the impact of changes in waterway and seabed access in the High North and Arctic. Speaking specifically about the Arctic, Mr. Hochstein suggested that there were three main areas which would be most ripe for international policy collaboration: basic search and rescue policies, co-operation in understanding the environmental impact of drilling and exploration of the seabed, and broader issues of the Law of the Sea and how it is applied to exclusive economic zones.

C. Missile Defence

The Obama Administration sees missile defence as an integral part of maintaining extended deterrence and assurance, and there remains wide consensus and broad support for ballistic missile defence within the US government and Congress, even though there are differences on some specifics.

Steve Hildreth, a missile defence expert with the Congressional Research Service, outlined to the delegation that within Congress and the US National Security establishment, there are significant areas of disagreement on how missile defence should be developed and utilized. The contours of these debates include cost, technological focus (sensors vs. interceptors), questions of near-term need, what capabilities are required beyond Phase 3, environmental concerns, operational constraints, and technical constraints. Local concerns of missile debris landing in populated areas, or in neighbouring countries such as Canada, also play a great part in missile defence discussions.

Engagement with the Russians on missile defence continues to be particularly challenging, as well as engagement with the Chinese. While North Korea has yet to successfully test its long range program, the DPRK has recently put an object into orbit, raising concerns in this area.

Mr. Hildreth explained that in the past decade there has developed a strong “Homeland Defence” component to missile defence. US defence officials have recently decided to explore more effective sensors rather than pushing for more capable interceptors. This is the more palatable choice, as sensors are less expensive and are considered by many to provide a greater augmentation in system capability than would improvements in interceptors. Currently the Department of Homeland Security is looking at as many as 25 potential candidate sites for east coast BMD.

In the United States, the missile defence budget is not subject to the normal DOD budget oversight process. Instead, budget decisions are made at such a high level that missile defence programs are often less vulnerable to overall budget trends. However, sequestration will effect missile defence testing. While technological development and procurement will be spared, the most complicated tests will be delayed and this could ultimately have long term effects in the speed of development of the overall program.

In response to members’ questions, Mr. Hildreth said that the use of lasers for missile defence was currently now being investigated by the United States Navy, and questions were increasingly being raised about the value of dialogue with Russia on missile defence since the Russian position seemed to be one of unwavering opposition.

D. Cyber security

No Allied government has yet successfully worked out how to deal with the cyber domain, suggested **Ian Wallace**, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution. The cyber domain remains a “confused and confusing subject,” and is most effectively understood when looked at in its entirety, rather than just through the prism of cyber security.

One of the most problematic policy responses to challenges in the realm of cyber is that it is often framed in terms of cyber conflict. This causes a high risk of NATO and the Allied countries individually framing and responding to threats in the cyber domain in an ineffective way. If Allied Governments frame the discussion in terms of a “cyber war” it delegates authority and action away from the general population. Publics see war as being waged by soldiers, not citizens, which detracts from the important things that citizens can do to reduce the cyber threat. Framing the cyber challenge as a “war” can also lead the population to become insensitive to the threat when they don’t personally “feel” any effects on their daily lives.

Focusing on the idea of cyber *conflict* or cyber *war* detracts from discussing cyber defence, Mr. Wallace suggested, this has great implications, especially for NATO's ability to conceptualize future force structure. Militaries are not yet making the changes needed to incorporate cyber as a new domain, rather than simply as a "support structure" for conventional domains. NATO may also be losing out in failing to ensure that nations which benefit from its training and capacity building operations are also securing their networks in a way that do not put their NATO partners at risk. In other words, Allies needed to be confident that the networks of other Allies and partners are secure.

Mr. Wallace also noted that large organizations are generally ill-equipped to deal with "disruptive innovation". Mr. Wallace suggested that new actors - young cyber-savvy people rather than the military - may potentially build new alliances and new cooperative efforts in their virtual environments. He worried that NATO has thus far failed to anticipate this and has yet to take it into account when evaluating its future security environment. China and India, countries that are not part of the Alliance and are at times at odds with its goals, are laying down the greatest amount of cyber infrastructure – infrastructure which will be used by Allied nations' populations and even governments.

Like any other emerging domain, the internet is currently very much an "ungoverned space," but perhaps even more so, as "un-governability" is coded into its very nature. However, it would be useful, Mr. Wallace believes, to understand the impact of the security organizations of Allied nations reaching out those on the "other end of the line." Often these actions tend to build relationships between security organizations, to the detriment of civilian ones. This, in turn, frames an interpretation that cyber is really within the purview of the defence and security agencies, and that it is the responsibility to apply a whole-of-government approach in this domain, whether or not it is the most effective response.

Mr. Wallace suggested that there is a significant role for elected leaders to play in this area. As the protection of critical infrastructure is simply not a role that NATO or even many of the national security agencies can effectively take on, parliaments could encourage the private sector to put this protection into place. With regards to offensive capabilities, Mr. Wallace likened an appropriate NATO operational concept for cyber to be something akin to the nuclear umbrella—where some States have offensive capabilities and many others contribute infrastructure or intelligence, without actually acting offensively.

4. Naval Air Station Fort Worth, Joint Reserve Base

The delegation travelled to Fort Worth, Texas, in order to visit Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base, and the Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Manufacturing Facilities.

The delegation was briefed on NAS Fort Worth JRB's missions and the units that make up its command. NAS Fort Worth was established as the Navy's first Joint Reserve Base and has been seen as a model for future base and unit consolidations. Units operating on this base include Navy logistics units, Air Force fighter wings, Marine Corps regiments, Army Reserve intelligence and aviation support units, and the 136th Airlift Wing of the Texas Air National Guard.

Over ten thousand service members are assigned to the units at NAS Fort Worth JRB, and the base is the third largest employer in Northern Texas, with an economic footprint of over \$2 Billion USD. 76 aircraft and unmanned systems flying over 31,000 sorties in 2012, supported missions ranging from refuelling and ISR, to homeland defence and conventional air superiority. In addition to the Navy, Air Force, and Air National Guard missions, the Marine Corps units provide construction engineering support.

Colonel Ferrell, with the Texas Air National Guard, briefed the delegation on the differences between conventional “Title 10” forces, and “Title 32” National Guard troops. She outlined for the group that many of the aircraft flown by the Air National Guard are federal assets, while the personnel, depending on their mission, can be paid for either by the federal budget or the state. Over the past decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, many Texas National Guard and Reserve personnel have been activated for federal duty – usually attached to a regular Army or Air Force unit.

Members were particularly impressed at the way the United States utilizes reserve forces and the National Guard so that they can be integrated with regular armed forces both flexibly and efficiently.

5. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Manufacturing Facilities

The delegation also visited the Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Manufacturing Facilities, where they received briefings on the F-35’s design and capabilities, participated in flight simulator demonstrations, toured the manufacturing facility shop floor, and viewed all three variants of the aircraft at close range. The delegation was able to review the impressive technological innovations of this “fifth generation” aircraft, including stealth design features such as internal fuel tanks and ordinance carriage, streamlined engine inlets, fixed array radar, and reduced engine nozzle signature. As the F-35 is brought on line in the air forces of eight partner nations, Lockheed anticipates that there will be a savings in operation and maintenance costs, as economies of scale can be utilized to bring down the cost of parts/skilled labour. As with many alliance projects, the potential gains in interoperability and joint international training may prove to be most valuable asset that the F-35 brings to the table.

Respectfully submitted,

Honourable Joseph A. Day, Senator
Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (NATO PA)

Travel Costs

ASSOCIATION	Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (NATO PA)
ACTIVITY	Visit of the Defence and Security Committee (DSC)
DESTINATION	Washington, D.C. and Dallas, Texas, United States
DATES	July 9 to 12, 2013
DELEGATION	
SENATE	Hon. Joseph A. Day, Senator
HOUSE OF COMMONS	Mr. Corneliu Chisu, M.P.
STAFF	
TRANSPORTATION	\$3,211.44
ACCOMMODATION	\$2,388.12
HOSPITALITY	\$0.00
PER DIEMS	\$846.14
OFFICIAL GIFTS	\$0.00
MISCELLANEOUS / REGISTRATION FEES	\$338.43
TOTAL	\$6,784.13