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In the wake of the successful NATO Summit in Lisbon at the end of 2010, the Alliance now faces the critical task of turning the political commitments made at the meeting into concrete actions and real capabilities. This was among the main themes discussed during a visit of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee to the United States January 31-February 4, 2011. The delegation, composed of 38 legislators from 20 NATO member states, was led by Committee Chairman Senator Joseph A. Day from Canada. The Committee’s mission to the United States, undertaken annually at the invitation of the U.S. House of Representatives, this year included dialogue with Congressional leaders of both Houses as well as senior officials from the Departments of State and Defense. The delegation also met with independent experts at the Council on Foreign Relations. Finally, the delegation travelled to San Diego, California, to inspect U.S. Navy assets, including a missile defence-capable guided missile destroyer and one of two cutting-edge Littoral Combat Ships. The wide-ranging discussions centred on the following themes, among others: the evolution of NATO, and its top priority operation in Afghanistan; missile defence; the rapidly developing situation in Egypt and across north Africa; relations with Russia; defence spending in an age of austerity; and the implications of the new configuration of the U.S. political system as a result of the November 2010 legislative elections. NATO AFTER LISBON The Lisbon Summit could be seen as the rollout of “NATO 3.0”, according to the Pentagon’s Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. If NATO’s first incarnation was about cold war-era defence against the Warsaw Pact, and 2.0 was defined by the Alliance’s efforts to integrate former cold war adversaries, NATO 3.0 was equipping itself to deal with the new challenges of the 21st century. In that regard, Ambassador Vershbow commented, the Lisbon summit was a great success in terms of what was agreed; however, the hard work of implementing the agreed decisions was only just beginning and would be made harder by the global economic downturn. As Allies looked to the progress necessary before NATO’s 2012 Summit, they would have to abandon 50 years of inefficient business practices; the economic crisis provided the impetus to do just that. The agreed streamlining of the committees at NATO headquarters and of the military command structure were difficult decisions, but the choices of where to cut would be harder still. In order to increase efficiencies in capabilities, Ambassador Vershbow called for greater pooling of resources and greater efforts toward specialization in ‘niche capabilities’ to arrive at economies of scale. The greatest possible coordination and transparency through the Alliance’s defence planning process was necessary in order to ensure no decision by a single nation would unbalance NATO as a whole. The recent UK-France defence agreement on collaboration on capabilities could serve as a guidepost for other allies, said Julianne Smith, Principal Director for Europe and NATO at the Department of Defense. Smith further underlined that this cooperation, as well as other efforts such as Germany’s transformation plans, should be coordinated with NATO; Allied Command Transformation could play a particularly useful role here. NATO was probably not the key player on combating piracy in the long term, according to Smith, who pointed out that the Alliance did not have the institutional tools to get at the root cause of the problem on shore; the U.S. remained very supportive of EU efforts on this issue. Smith suggested there was a greater need to learn the lessons of previous operations and translate them into current and future engagements. One such lesson was the need to integrate civil and military efforts, including having reconstruction as a key pillar of any operation going forward. In particular, with a few exceptions, nations generally lack deployable civilian capabilities. The need for developing capabilities in this area was one of the key conclusions of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which had espoused a vision to get beyond ad hoc, under-funded civilian capabilities for operations. Smith also suggested that the U.S. would like to see the EU take on a greater role in reconstruction activities. The agenda going towards the next summit in 2012 would be focused on four priorities, according to State Department officials: providing resources to ISAF; organizing the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review to examine the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities required by NATO; reforming NATO structures; and modernizing partnerships. Defense department officials confirmed that discussions on reviewing the U.S. force posture in Europe were underway at the time of the visit, having been postponed until after the Lisbon Summit. Indeed, Defence Secretary Gates had been quoted as stating that there was excess force structure in Europe. Consultations with Allies were scheduled to take place shortly after the time of the visit. Underpinning these discussions would be consideration of the appropriate mix of assets in Europe, to include missile defence elements, counter-terrorism forces, maritime security assets, and perhaps fewer ground forces geared to the challenges of the cold war. A changed posture would, defence officials stated, continue to ensure visible reassurance to European Allies. AFGHANISTAN Progress in Afghanistan had been even greater than expected in recent months, according to David Samuel Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. The additional forces deployed as part of ISAF, as well as the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces, were producing effects that were fundamentally changing the rules of the game, especially in the Taliban heartland areas of Kandahar and Helmand provinces. The gains won in recent months – in particular, pushing the Taliban out of major populated areas, leading to greater numbers of Afghans feeling safer – remained fragile and reversible, according to Sedney, who underlined that Afghan leadership will be required to sustain them. Afghans were willing and now increasingly able to contribute, but still needed a great deal of assistance in developing civilian capacity in particular. The NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership agreed at the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon represented a commitment that, despite calling for a transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan government by 2014, was not time-limited in its overall scope, according to Sedney. The U.S. had also committed on a bilateral basis to a bolstered partnership with Afghanistan. Mr. Sedney predicted that violence would increase over the next months until the summer, as the insurgents seek to regain areas lost over the last 3-6 months and as international and Afghan forces continue to push out into previously uncontested areas. Thus, increased reporting of violent incidents in the short term should not be seen as evidence of failure, he emphasized, but rather the normal course of the overall strategy. The pocess of transitioning areas to Afghan security lead would be governed by a joint, Afghan-ISAF process that would review, province-by-province, what areas would be suitable. U.S. officials underlined that as transition occurred in various areas of Afghanistan, international forces deployed to those areas should not automatically be withdrawn; rather, they should be reinvested and either deployed into other parts of Afghanistan or as part of other lines of the operation, such as a shift from combat operations to training. Decisions on troop withdrawals should, they emphasized, be coordinated at the NATO level. Senator Lindsey Graham urged the delegates to support the deployment of additional trainers to accelerate the development of the Afghan National Security Forces; to support programs to address the acute problem areas of rule of law and governance; and to support a coordinated approach aimed at encouraging Pakistan to address the problem of safe havens for insurgents. Senator Graham stated that the resources devoted through the end of the year would be decisive in the Afghan campaign, which would eventually demonstrate whether NATO remained a credible and reliable actor on the international stage. CYBER STRATEGY The cyber-related outcomes of NATO’s Lisbon Summit were very encouraging, according to Defense Department expert Steven Schleien. Increased political attention to the issue and plans to augment the protection afforded NATO’s own networks were seen as positive steps, as was the commitment to assist member nations in their own defensive efforts and the incorporation of cyber dimensions into planning and exercises. NATO should not define whether a given type of cyber attack would fall under Article 5, according to Schleien; the very ambiguity of such a posture would enhance deterrence. Article 4 security consultations were, in any case, always available to member states who considered themselves under threat. While NATO was not developing offensive cyber-capabilities, Schleien pointed out that the Alliance could always request assistance in producing a given cyber-effect from the small group of member states that had developed such capabilities, in arrangements somewhat analogous to NATO’s nuclear posture. The U.S. does not see how the classic model of arms control treaties applies in the area of cyber-security, but does support the establishment of international norms through expert bodies in organizations such as the United Nations. Generally speaking, Schleien warned, the technical sophistication required for a potential attacker to present a threat in cyberspace has decreased dramatically over time. The U.S. strategy has relied on building resilience in systems in order to defeat cyber attacks and maintaining a deterrent posture that includes the threat of kinetic retaliation for a politically-attributable cyber-attack, he stated. One challenge the Defence Department faced was recruiting and retaining technically skilled personnel to address the threat; many of these experts were lured away from public service by the private sector. MISSILE DEFENCE The Obama administration saw missile defence as an integral part of maintaining extended deterrence and assurance, and to meeting rising threats without creating instabilities, according to Dr. Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. While the threat to the homeland was growing, the U.S. had assets in place to maintain a strong and well-hedged position through its Phased Adaptive Approach, which provided for re-locatable assets and capabilities to meet evolving threats. There was consensus within the Alliance about the growing Iranian ballistic missile threat to southern Europe, according to the Defence Department’s Ambassador Vershbow, and Iran would have capabilities within the decade that would put the entire territory of the Alliance at risk. Dr. Roberts underlined that conventional approaches to deterrence may not be applicable in the case of Iran’s leadership. Robert Einhorn, Special Advisor on Iran and North Korea at the Department of State, suggested that the concern was that Iran would be emboldened by a nuclear capability, presenting additional regional security challenges. NATO missile defence was a relative bargain, according to defence officials, who underlined that the U.S. was contributing, on a national basis, an entire architecture of sensors and interceptors. NATO’s potential investments in a command and control system (which would allow nations to ‘plug in’ their respective sensors and interceptors) to achieve complete coverage of Allied territory were extremely modest by comparison, amounting to less than 200 million euros over 10 years. While command and control arrangements for the NATO system had yet to be determined, NATO had successfully made similarly complex arrangements in the past with other systems, Such discussions, including decisions on rules of engagement, will unsurprisingly take time to sort out, according to Roberts. The U.S. viewed missile defence as a compliment and not a substitute for extended deterrence based on nuclear weapons. Allies had decided to undertake a Defence and Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR) to discuss these issues as they looked toward their 2012 Summit meeting. RUSSIA The improvement in relations with Russia was real, according to State Department officials, who nevertheless underlined that principles such as host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign troops, issues of particular relevance in Georgia and Moldova, would not be sacrificed. The re-set of relations with Russia was possibly the most impressive foreign policy achievement by the Obama administration to date, according to Steve Sestanovich, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. However, it remained to be seen whether it could overcome the historical pattern of re-sets being followed by high expectations and eventually disappointment and hostility. While Sestanovich thought it had been a good calculation to downplay disagreements on Georgia, Russian leaders viewed this as acquiescence by the west; the west therefore needed to re-engage on this issue in order to avoid a miscalculation by Russia. The major benchmarks of the relationship in the coming period were likely to include Russian domestic politics (parliamentary and presidential elections); high-profile repression of political dissidents; and Russian accession to the World Trade Organization. The U.S. administration viewed cooperation with Russia on missile defence as important, but would not agree to a fully integrated joint system, with shared command and control, which Russian officials have advocated. Russia could provide potentially valuable sensor information that could improve NATO’s defences – and the reverse was also true, according to the Pentagon’s Dr. Roberts. Discussions with Russia on missile defence cooperation were underway both in the NATO-Russia Council and through bilateral U.S.-Russia meetings. U.S. POLITICS Cutting spending was a key priority of the new leadership of the House of Representatives, according to Congressman Dan Burton, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Europe and Eurasia. Representative Mike Turner, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and Congressman Jeff Miller, a member of the delegation, suggested that difficult choices would have to be made on entitlement spending. Rep. Turner underlined his view that the U.S. public was ready to support reforms. The polarization of the U.S. political system was as extreme as it has been at any time since the 19th century, according to Charles Kupchan, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Divisions on social issues had been a constant, but had not until recently spilled over to issues of foreign policy, which had historically been seen as an area beyond the reach of partisanship. Kupchan attributed this in part to the gradual disappearance of the post-WWII generation of internationalist politicians. Indeed, the divide was not just between Democrats and Republicans, but also within the Republican Party itself, with the emergence of the Tea Party representing a splintering of the Republican Party, with a new generation that did not share the values of its leadership. The domestic political situation had strangled the ability of this White House to make strategic leaps, according to Steven Clemons, Senior Fellow at the New American Foundation, who predicted that politics in Washington – particularly in Congress – would only get more toxic in the next two years. Kupchan predicted a period of retrenchment in U.S. foreign policy, with consensus across the political system on ‘lightening the load’ on the U.S. of its commitments abroad. As a result, the U.S. would be looking for Europe to do more on the international stage. When asked about the impacts of the “wikileaks” controversy, senior officials from different executive branch agencies expressed their regret that the information had been made public, and stated that it was a result of the much greater sharing of information across the U.S. institutions after the 9/11 attacks, which was intended to improve the chances that terrorist plots would be uncovered. The extent of the information sharing was now being rebalanced, officials told the delegation. While the scandal has done enduring damage to diplomats’ ability to have candid conversations with trusted interlocutors, the cables have also demonstrated that the U.S. largely relates the same message publicly and privately. MILITARY SITE VISITS The delegation travelled to San Diego, California, in order to visit the U.S. Navy Combined Third Fleet Headquarters . Command Third Fleet is the command for all naval units on the West Coast, covering the eastern Pacific from the international dateline to the U.S., from the North Pole to the South Pole. The delegation was briefed on the command’s functions, the massive RIMPAC naval exercises, in which a number of NATO Allies participate; the command’s approach to cyberdefence; and its support of the ballistic missile defence mission. At the U.S. Naval Base in San Diego, the delegation visited the USS Freedom Littoral Combat Ship (LCS-1), a fast, agile, focused-mission platform designed for operation in near-shore environments yet capable of open-ocean operation. It is designed to defeat asymmetric “anti-access” threats such as mines, quiet diesel submarines and fast surface craft and has both military and humanitarian applications. Its principal innovation is its capacity to change out ‘mission modules’ of capabilities specifically designed for one of three missions, to include anti-submarine warfare, humanitarian assistance, and de-mining. It is also characterized by its small crew and highly automated control systems. The U.S. Navy planned to purchase 55 Littoral Combat Ships, the delegation was told. The delegation also visited the USS John Paul Jones DDG-53 Ballistic Missile Defence-capable Destroyer. The John Paul Jones was one of 21 ships equipped with the Aegis system designed to defeat ballistic missile threats. The ships together form the sea-based element of the overall ballistic missile defence system and represent the cornerstone of the Obama Administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defence for Europe. Finally, the delegation reviewed impressive technological innovations being developed at the Systems Command Pacific military facility of the U.S. Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. These included a seawater-based antenna; new means of efficiently sorting and processing news articles to extract the most valuable open source information; a wirelessly communicating, sensor-enabled glove; and high-performance unmanned force protection vehicles. Respectfully submitted,
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