The Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) has the honour to present
its report on the Joint Meeting of the Defence and Security, Economics and
Security and Political Committees, held in Brussels, Belgium on 14–16 February
2015. Canada was
represented by Mrs. Cheryl Gallant, M.P., Head of the Canadian Delegation,
Senator Raynell Andreychuk, Senator Daniel Lang, Senator Joseph A. Day,
Steven MacKinnon, M.P., Pierre Paul‑Hus, M.P., and Anthony Rota, M.P.
The main purpose of the annual joint committee
meetings in Brussels, which also include the officers of the Committee on the
Civil Dimensions of Security and the Science and Technology Committee, is to
provide delegates with an update on the Alliance’s activities and operations
from senior bureaucrats and military officers working at NATO headquarters.
Canadian delegates were also briefed by Canada’s Permanent Representative to
NATO, Ambassador Kerry Buck and the Military Representative of Canada to NATO,
Vice-Admiral Bob Davidson.
The meetings in Brussels were conducted under the
Chatham House rule.
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS
EU Responses to Terrorism
The
point was made that NATO is a collective defence alliance. Therefore, each
member state is responsible for maintaining its own internal security. However,
NATO can and does support the European Union’s (EU’s) counter-terrorism
efforts. For example, to assist the EU in responding to the Syrian refugee
crisis, the NATO Standing Maritime Group 2 provides FRONTEX (the EU’s border
security agency) intelligence it collects on human smuggling operations in the
Aegean. FRONTEX then uses this intelligence to
intercept smuggling vessels and return passengers to Turkey to be properly
processed.
When a member of the Canadian delegation
intervened to question what rules of engagement NATO Standing Maritime Group 2
has been given with respect to rescuing those aboard smuggling vessels in
distress, they were told that those four nations (Canada, Germany, Turkey and
Greece) whose ships were participating in the NATO operation are still bound by
their national obligations to uphold maritime laws pertaining to vessels in
distress.
Increasing intelligence sharing while protecting
privacy rights is a central challenge in responding to the terrorism threat
posed by returning foreign fighters, some of whom are exploiting migrant flows
to re‑enter Europe undetected. What is required is a comprehensive
approach. For example, there are 700 Europol analysts working hard on
linking up their respective nations’ criminal intelligence data, it was
suggested this effort should be extended to the sharing of analysis.
Questions were also raised about the functionality
of existing information sharing systems such as the Schengen Information System
(SIS), which does not yet provide the means for a systematic examination of
each person crossing the border into Europe. While the SIS, in theory, provides
a capability to instantaneously examine multiple databases pertaining to EU
citizens, it does not address third country nationals. Here too, a systematic
check is required, particularly for false or stolen passport records.
In this connection, increased information sharing
and linkage between key EU databases was advocated. Privacy protection rules
requiring collected personal data to be used only for the original purpose for
which it was collected are an impediment. For example, until recently, this
principle stood in the way of sharing biometric (fingerprint) data collected by
EU member states from asylum seekers and irregular migrants under the EURODAC
program. Because the purpose of the EURODAC fingerprint collection is limited
to determining which European country has responsibility for considering an
asylum claimant’s application, until recently, this biometric data could not be
shared with EU police agencies to compare with biometrics stored in their own
criminal record databases, despite it making sense to do so as a means to spot
false documentation. New regulations have enabled comparison with the Visa
Information System (where permitted) and, under strict conditions and only for
the purpose of preventing terrorism or serious crime, existing criminal records
databases. At present, EUROPOL and national law enforcement agencies are still
not permitted to conduct systematic checks of EURODAC data, nor can this data
be shared with third countries.
Increased information sharing between the United
States and Europe was also advocated, with one official suggesting that the
former continues to over-classify its intelligence. They argued that the
principle of protecting sources and methods receives too much weight in
decisions to share intelligence with third parties.
There was some pushback on the notion of increased
data sharing, however, with one delegate suggesting that such “big data”
approaches do not solve the problem of failure to act on available warning
information.
Regarding the issue of European efforts to counter
radicalization to violence, a member of the Canadian delegation raised a
question about the root causes of this radicalization. One response suggested
that the root cause was the sectarian policies of countries such as Iraq, where
power is not distributed equally among Shia and Sunni. Another respondent pointed
to the role of Salafism and the “environment of intolerance” it creates as
being part of the problem. They suggested that Saudi Arabia’s funding of imams
and mosques world-wide that promote intolerance are also problematic and that,
with 20 million Muslims in Europe, more efforts need to be made to train
imams in the European context. Finally, the respondent said that it would be
unfair to those who wish to promote more enlightened forms of Islam to suggest
that religion plays no role in terrorism.
NATO’s Political Agenda towards the Warsaw Summit
The threats NATO currently faces are complex, if
not intractable. Some of these problems, such as that posed by terrorism, will
take generations to defeat. This is also a multiple-front challenge, with issues
currently emanating from the east and south. Between short-term crises and
longer-term challenges like that emanating from Russia’s annexation of Crimea
and aggressive tactics in the Baltic region, it was suggested that NATO could
be overwhelmed.
Additional resources provided to confront the
relatively straightforward collective defence challenge from the east will help
Allies deal with that issue, but not with those issues arising from the south.
Whereas the eastern flank threat requires NATO to prepare to fight on its own
territory – something that one official described as is “in our genes” to do –
there is no simple solution, no readily available “off-ramp” to address threats
from the south.
Thus, it was argued that NATO must maintain a
balance in how it responds to the differing challenges presented from these two
regions. To confront eastern flank challenges, NATO will be required to:
·Determine what is required to establish
deterrence in the current context;
·Prepare for hybrid warfare.
·Accept new NATO members while seeking dialogue
with Russia.
·Create a strategy to deal with Russia over the
long-term, including communication of “red-lines” in times of crisis.
With respect to adapting deterrence to the current
context, key questions that will be raised at the July 2016 NATO Warsaw
Summit include the number of forward-deployed forces necessary to create an
effective “tripwire” against attack on the eastern flank. NATO’s initial idea
was to emphasize the creation of a rapid reaction capability backed by troops
dedicated to reinforcement but also available to respond to other
contingencies. Respectively, this tripwire is a “Spearhead Force” comprising a
5,000-strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force carved out of a 40,000-strong
NATO Response Force, both falling under the command of Supreme Allied Command
Europe (SACEUR).
However, given Russia’s recent aggressive
behaviours, Central and Eastern European NATO members favour a maximalist
approach to the tripwire force that would see permanently stationed troops on
their territories. Though the United States’ $US 3.4 billion European
Reassurance Initiative illustrates that there is growing acceptance that a
stronger forward deployment is necessary, there is now a need to look at how to
multinationalize this forward deployment and make it sustainable.
As part of its efforts to address southern flank
issues, NATO must rely on partnerships with regional players wherever possible.
In this connection, building the defence capacity of partners such as Iraq,
Tunisia and Jordan, to NATO’s south is essential. Building defence capacity in
a non-permissive environment such as Libya, however, raises a different set of
questions that NATO will be required to confront in the upcoming months.
Though NATO does not formally participate in
international coalition operations in Iraq and Syria, individual members play a
significant role. NATO supports these member states by backfilling key assets
these members commit to coalition efforts, such as Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) aircraft.
Allied Defence Budgets – Implementing the Wales
Defence Spending Pledge
In assessing the defence budgets of NATO members,
it is important to recognize that there is no shared understanding of what a
defence budget is. Thus, to capture defence procurement a member state may make
outside of its defence budget, NATO’s Policy and Planning Division considers
defence expenditures as a whole. It also examines what is actually being
accomplished with spending, whether the expenditure is simply more money being
directed towards national defence requirements alone or if it is investment
that counts towards NATO burden-sharing?
In respect of burden-sharing investment, NATO does
not need more personnel but, rather, more key categories of equipment and
capabilities that are maintained in a high state of readiness. NATO needs to be
capable of high-intensity combat against a peer-state competitor. What worked
in Afghanistan will not work against an attack from the east. NATO must be able
to handle more than one challenge, which requires a higher readiness, with
fully manned units that are fully equipped and fully trained with stores, parts
and ammunition stocked. It is important to remember the wording of the Wales
Summit declaration, which called on Allies to display the political will to
provide required capabilities and deploy forces “when they are needed,” which
is a reference to a requirement for readiness.
Achieving the goal of manning the NATO Response
Force to 40,000 personnel will not be enough on its own: NATO needs to do
further work on moving these forces and on reinforcing them. It has only
recently had to think about how to do reinforcements on its own territory,
which requires obtaining authorities from implicated nations to transit military
equipment – including armed aircraft and other potentially hazardous material –
through their jurisdictions. In this connection, it was noted by one delegation
that NATO headquarters required two months to negotiate the deployment of 2,100
forces participating in a recent Baltics-focused exercise.
Another participant pointed out that the United
States is essentially alone among the allies, in its ability to manoeuvre at
the divisional level, with other NATO members being limited to brigade-level
endeavours at best. When a Canadian delegation member asked how to reconcile
these comments about needing to fight at the divisional level while preparing
for hybrid warfare challenges, such as small units of soldiers fighting out of
uniform, the member was informed that NATO must be prepared for high-intensity
combat as well as the small-scale skirmishes of hybrid warfare.
An important outcome of the Wales Summit was the
decision to get back into civil defence issues such as continuity of
government, food, water, and cyber capabilities in the face of attack. Paying
attention to these issues, which are all national responsibilities, contributes
to NATO resilience. At the Wales Summit, NATO agreed to set reasonable
standards to achieve acceptable levels of resilience. In preparation for the
Warsaw Summit, NATO members will need to work out what these standards should
be and how to measure conformance with them. The Canadian delegation received
assurances that NATO is not about to become a regulator but, rather, members
would be held to account on resilience issues because of the potential risk to
operations.
Prospects for NATO-Russia Relations Ahead of the
Warsaw Summit
The current crisis in
relations between NATO and Russia is even more complicated than issues encountered
during the Cold War because of the broad array of
international instruments that Russia no longer respects, such as the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Vienna Document 2011.
Any predictability that
these instruments created has been eliminated. For example, the Vienna Document
and its associated confidence building regime was not
created with any thought that snap exercises, such as those now being
continuously carried out by Russia, would become the norm, not the exception.
Even during the Cold War, there were “no go”
areas, such as nuclear policy, that could not be broached by the leader without
consultation with the Politburo and Duma. Under President Vladimir Putin, there
is no such debate and nuclear war is no longer unthinkable. There were big
crowds at this year’s May Day parade in Moscow and the biggest cheers were
reserved for the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. For Russia, the
importance of nuclear weapons is more than prestige. Threatening to use them,
the intimidation, is part of their propaganda.
To reduce risks in the face of Russia’s lack of
transparency and military activities, including constant exercises and air
incursions, NATO must seek dialogue. However, NATO must back any dialogue it
has with Russia with a strong defence and deterrent posture, including nuclear
weapons. In its own planning, NATO has no choice but take into account Russia’s
declaratory policy on use of nuclear weapons.
Until 2013, the Black Sea region was not even on
NATO’s radar. The Alliance’s presence in the region, including its ballistic
missile defence capabilities, and the declarations it has made on the issue at
past summits are important. However, NATO has a long way to go in addressing
the problem presented by Russia’s complex strategy in this region and
elsewhere.
Moscow’s withdrawal from the Conventional Forces
in Europe Treaty, its neglect of international obligations with respect to
Crimea and Ukraine, its force buildup in Kaliningrad Oblast [an exclave between
Poland and Lithuania] and efforts to strengthen its nuclear forces are all of
concern to NATO.
NATO must demonstrate
its cohesion in the face of these threatening behaviours through implementation of its Readiness Action Plan and its determination to confront
Russia and its allies. At the same time, it must remain open to negotiated
change, including updates to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe’s (OSCE’s) Vienna Document and a ceasefire in Syria.
Earlier on, the Canadian delegation noted that
Russia’s support for Syria creates challenges on NATO’s southern flank. Others
expressed the view that Russian-Syrian cooperation undermines Turkey and Europe
more broadly and that Russia’s “weaponization” of refugees is tantamount to its
use of “little green men in Crimea” in undermining NATO. However, even if
Russia and NATO have differing objectives regarding Daesh, the most urgent
matter is to obtain a ceasefire in Syria.
Force Readiness for Current and Future Operations
When they met in Brussels on 10–11 February 2016,
NATO defence ministers discussed the implications of a recent RAND Organization
report entitled Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank. Drawing
on the results of a series of wargames held in 2014 and 2015, the report
concluded that, given current NATO force deployments and capabilities, Russia
could overrun the Baltic States within 60 hours. In light of the report’s
findings, SACEUR was tasked to report back on the need to augment NATO’s
forward presence in the Baltics.
With respect to anti-access/area denial (AA/AD),
Russia’s military build-up in Kaliningrad is concerning. Included in this
buildup are batteries of S-400 surface to air missiles, which could be used to
deny NATO military access to airspace over the region. Concerns were also
expressed about the potential permanent deployment of mobile Iskander missile
systems that can launch ballistic and cruise missile variants. Iskander-M
missiles are tactical-range, nuclear-capable multiple independently targetable
re‑entry vehicle (MIRV) ballistic missiles that can deliver multiple
nuclear warheads over a battlefield in a single launch. Iskander-K missiles are
cruise missiles that may have a range sufficient to place all of the major
cities of Europe in danger.
Russia’s build-up in Kaliningrad Oblast [an
exclave that borders Poland and Lithuania] enables it to drive a wedge between
Lithuania and Poland by invading a small area of northeastern Poland often
referred to as the “Suwalki Gap.” Moving NATO reinforcements into this region
would be nightmarish, according to one official. There are 88 political
agreements in place that have to be considered prior to undertaking any
movement of military troops or equipment. This is hard enough in a permissive
environment, let alone working in an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) situation
where cyber attacks are underway, observed one presenter.
NATO needs to work
out how to combine with local forces in a crisis, how much authority to pre‑delegate to SACEUR and what kind of command structure is needed, it was
argued. In respect of command structure requirements, SACEUR has been trimmed
back considerably in recent years because NATO was mainly dealing with
brigade-level deployments. But this structuring does not take into account the
possibility that the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force is not enough to stop
an invasion. Thought needs to be given to what would happen on Day 3, on Day 4,
and so on, said an official.
Transportation infrastructure, such as air and sea
ports as well as roads, is also of concern because it is fundamental to rapid
reinforcement. NATO has established a common fund to address this issue and,
under the European Reassurance Initiative, the United States will contribute
money towards this fund.
Regarding hybrid warfare, questions were raised
about NATO’s vulnerability to the “little green men” of Ukraine. In this
regard, the recent cyber attacks against Greece are of concern and underscore
the importance of developing resilience in the face of such tactics.
Parliamentarians were told to expect a pledge to achieve an enhanced cyber
defence capability at Warsaw.
Beyond the ongoing issue of intelligence-sharing,
NATO lacks formalized indicators and warnings for hybrid threats. Knowing what
it is looking for in the hybrid warfare context is essential, because NATO will
need to be in a position to make decisions on the basis of fragmentary
information alone. And, given the need to work closely with the EU, this hybrid
warfare inclusive assessment and early warning framework must be developed
collaboratively.
On 10 February 2016, NATO and the EU signed an
agreement to share information on cyber incidents. It was argued that the two
organizations now need to develop intelligence sharing arrangements on other
forms of crisis that are happening in the hybrid context. Russia’s
disinformation campaign alleging the rape in Berlin of a German-Russian girl by
men associated with the Syrian migrant flow is just one example of a hybrid
challenge that requires agile intelligence sharing.
Once agreement is reached on indicators and
warnings for hybrid threats, NATO will be in a better position to develop
graduated response plans and then exercise these graduated response plans with
real-life scenarios that engage diplomatic and military elements.
NATO and United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1325
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325
(UNSCR 1325), which called on member states to adopt a gender perspective in
considering issues of armed conflict and peacekeeping, was passed in 2000. Since
then, not a lot has been accomplished towards implementation globally,
according to one presenter.
However, NATO has a lot to be proud of with
respect to implementation, even if there remains much to be done before all the
Resolution’s principles are fully realized. It is the biggest coalition,
world-wide, that actively promotes UNSCR 1325.
NATO must sustain the investments it has made and
the knowledge it has acquired on this issue. For example, NATO should refine
its knowledge about the impact of conflict on women and ensure that inclusive
security frames its thinking. Mainstreaming gender is just another way of
saying that gender analysis should routinely be part of all planning.
The percentage of women in senior decision-making
positions in NATO decreased in 2015; down from 10.5% in 2014 to 10.3% in 2015.
Nonetheless, there is talk that a woman might be chosen to oversee NATO Allied
Command Transformation.
Retention of women is a big issue,
parliamentarians were told. NATO members need to create a professional working
environment where there is zero tolerance for harassment. The Canadian Minister
of National Defence’s continuous references to “his men and women” sets a great
example. It underscores the use of all resources to hand.
In countering violent extremism and
radicalization, there is a clear link to the gender angle on issues such as the
recruitment of women. For example, research has shown that there are different
triggers for men and women that attract them to Daesh.
The UNSCR 1325 framework also adds value to NATO
countries’ thinking on the refugee crisis. Needs assessments should include
gender analysis from the outset.
One presenter emphasized that if equal rights are
the foundation to our system, then we must reflect that in practice.
Information Warfare
NATO’s Public Affairs strategy comprises the
following objectives: “awareness” through 24/7 media monitoring; “analysis” to
better understand who NATO’s audience is, what they are hearing and how to
counter disinformation they may be receiving; “projection of alternative
narratives” that are based on our values and which dispel myths; and
“alignment” within the NATO Public Affairs organization, within NATO and with
other partner organizations.
NATO has a web portal for public outreach called
“Setting the Record Straight” and it engages media directly in Georgia,
Moldova, Montenegro, Russia and Ukraine providing interviews and appearing on
television talk shows. It also cooperates with the EU on responding to Russian
disinformation.
Satellite imagery is important. NATO’s provision
to the media of images showing the build-up of Russian forces along the Ukraine
border was a turning point in international media perception.
However, NATO does not possess its own
intelligence satellites. This means there is no guarantee that NATO would be
able to immediately back up an assertion with photographic evidence. To provide
media outlets with the evidence they seek, NATO’s Public Affairs Office (NATO
PAO) must thus appeal to member nations to declassify and share satellite
imagery. Even though it is easier to obtain the same imagery directly from
commercial satellite firms, NATO PAO tries to avoid using this method because
journalists viewed declassified imagery as having greater credibility.
NATO PAO cannot conduct its own opinion polls and
some members forbid the commissioning of such polls, which makes it hard to
measure the impact of its work.
NATO PAO has very few channels to reach the
Russian public, but its spokesperson appears quite often on Russian talk shows.
Significant resources are needed to continuously monitor Russian media in order
to rebut the distortions. As a result, NATO PAO is required to balance its
investment in reaching the Russian intelligentsia with maintaining the
Alliance’s base of supporters.
Russia’s narrative stays broadly constant but with
shifts in focus. For example, its campaign against Ukraine is in abeyance and
the focus is now falling on NATO, as illustrated by Prime Minister
Dmitry Medvedev’s 13 February 2016 speech before a security conference in
Munich which suggested that a “new Cold War” had begun and that NATO’s
deployments in Eastern Europe and the Balkans are aimed at Russia and
destabilizing. Lately, Russia is also focusing on Montenegro, suggesting that
it is “being dragged” into NATO against its will.
NATO’s Role in Deterrence, Non-Proliferation, and
Disarmament in Europe Today
Over the years, NATO has had to adapt its
deterrent posture. In the Cold War, deterrence meant having personnel and heavy
tanks forward-deployed and a very sizable nuclear force in Europe. Contemporary
deterrence has to be more flexible and adaptable. It is about rapid
reinforcement (enabled by the Readiness Action Plan, the NATO Response Force
and forward presence), persistent and rotational presence (supported by ongoing
exercises), and infrastructure for reinforcement (including, possible basing).
In short, the NATO defence ministers have
concluded that speed, strength and resilience will be key themes for the Warsaw
summit.
Meaningful dialogue with Russia cannot be achieved
in the absence of deterrence and strength. Parliamentarians were reminded that
the arms control breakthroughs of the seventies were preceded by a build-up of
military strength that created the stability that enabled arms control
dialogue.
NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture (DPPR) was
reviewed in 2012. While the DPPR might come up again at the Warsaw Summit,
there is a stronger case for reopening the Strategic Concept. For example,
Russia’s military build-up in the Kaliningrad region forces NATO to consider
missile defences that include defence against cruise missile threats. Missile
defence in this context places a premium on early warning. Thus, to spot Russian missile
launches, NATO will also need permanent, forward-deployed monitoring assets, including assets such as U.S. Army Joint Land
Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) blimp.
Roundtable Meeting with NATO Ambassadors
The Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association Chair
intervened to commend the speed of NATO’s response to the international plea
for help on the refugee crisis. At the same time, she voiced concern over
Russia’s use of refugees as part of its hybrid warfare campaign against NATO
and urged NATO to continue its counter-propaganda efforts in this regard.
Conclusion
The annual joint committee meetings in Brussels
offer Canada’s delegates the opportunity to have in-depth discussions with
senior officials at NATO and the EU as well as with parliamentarians from NATO
member-states on current defence and economic priorities pertinent to the
Alliance.
Respectfully submitted,
Mrs. Cheryl Gallant, M.P.
Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (NATO PA)