Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and
Defence Capabilities (DSC)
Only days before the launch of a pivotal presidential
election campaign in Ukraine, a delegation of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s
Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities visited Kyiv on
October 12, 2009.
The main conclusion the delegation reached was that
domestic politics continued to cause significant difficulties in the execution
of coherent foreign and security policies and the continuation of reform
processes; however, there was some prospect of greater stability and progress
after the conclusion of the election process.
The group of members of parliament from eight NATO
countries was led by Sub-Committee Rapporteur Sverre Myrli of Norway. The
delegation sought to better understand Ukraine’s security concerns through
meetings with members of the Ukrainian Parliament and representatives of the
executive branch.
In addition, the delegation visited the testing
facilities of the Antonov aircraft company. Antonov transport aircraft
are used extensively by NATO nations to provide strategic lift capabilities in
support of operations, including NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
According to Andriy Shkil, Head of the Ukrainian Delegation
to the NATO PA, the main geopolitical orientation of Ukraine was not at issue
in the election, even if there was pressure from abroad to change this
orientation.
Rather, the focus of the electorate was on the economic
crisis and on issues of law and order. Indeed, members of parliament
related that they had not had a single question from constituents on NATO in
several years; voters were more concerned about the issues such as the minimum
wage, the Russian language’s official status, energy policy, and
education. If candidates disagreed on anything regarding NATO, it was
more about whether a referendum would be required.
Shkil predicted that Yulia Tymoshenko will be Ukraine’s
new President, and Ukraine would be in a more stable position and better able
to move forward actively in foreign policy and in cooperation with NATO in
particular. No matter who wins the presidential election, there was no
going back on the broad strategic outlines of Ukraine’s foreign policy,
according to several speakers.
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS
The election, it was hoped, would resolve a domestic
political deadlock between the President and Prime Minister that was causing
significant paralysis. For example, the positions of Minister of Foreign
Affairs and of Minister of Defence had been vacant for upwards of six
months. The latter was especially important given that the Chief of Staff
of the armed forces had resigned and the situation needed to be
stabilized. Members of Parliament suggested that these vacant posts were
a result of the political struggle leading up to the Presidential
elections.
Ostap Semerak, a member of the Verkhovna Rada’s budget
committee, explained that the budgetary situation regarding the Ukrainian military
was quite complicated and only worsened because of the financial crisis, which
had caused a dramatic drop in Ukrainian GDP. In the context of a major
reform of the national budgetary system, characterized by increasing devolution
to local authorities, the President had vetoed a parliamentary law on
decentralization, and the political situation had also prevented the adoption
of the government’s budget, including funding for the military. He stated
that less than 1% of GDP was being devoted to the armed forces in 2009-2010, a
very small number by NATO standards; the lion’s share of spending was on
maintenance of personnel.
Financial problems were hampering the armed forces in a
number of ways. First, they had caused a significant reduction in planned
combat training activities. The armed forces were also prevented from
participating in multinational exercises due to the failure of the Verkhovna
Rada to approve necessary legislation; as a result, a great deal of potential
funding allocated for this purpose had been wasted. Members of the Rada
explained that this was due to the Parliament’s dysfunction during the
political crisis and in the run-up to the elections. According to Viktor
Korendovych, Director of the Department for Military Policy and Strategic
Planning of the Ministry of Defence, as a result of the budgetary problems, the
defence establishment had had to find properties to sell in order to fund its
budget.
DEFENCE REFORMS
Viktor Korendovych of the Ministry of Defence, briefing
members on Ukraine’s defence reform process, explained that the Ukrainian
military was striving for full interoperability with the NATO Response Force;
indeed, Ukraine is slated to become the first NATO Partner country to
participate in the NATO Response Force.
While plans had called for a reduction in the size of
the force from 245,000 personnel in 2005 to 143,000 in 2011, the Ukrainian
armed forces had stabilized at roughly 200,000 personnel, a level that was
deemed prudent regarding territorial defence needs after the August 2008 war in
Georgia.
According to Mykola Tomenko, Deputy Chairman of the
Verkhovna Rada, and co-chairman of the Ukraine – NATO Inter-Parliamentary
Council, the armed forces were moving towards full professionalisation and
other reforms; the only question between the major political groups was the
pace of this change. For instance, while the Prime Minister had proposed
a rapid professionalisation, the President had rejected this as impossible and
instead proposed laws increasing the size of the armed forces.
UKRAINE, NATO, AND REGIONAL SECURITY
Ihor Arguchinskyi, Head of the Department of
International Security within the National Security and Defence Council of
Ukraine, focused on Russia’s role in regional security. The Russian
political elite continues to seek influence in Ukraine, and has grown more
confident given the ‘success’ of the Georgia conflict, according to
Arguchinskyi. Russia’s influence on Ukraine – and its view that Ukraine
belongs in its sphere of influence -- will be greatest when NATO considers this
to be a bilateral issue and none of the Alliance’s concern. He suggested
that the NATO-Russia dialogue continually reinforce principles of the
inviolability of the territorial integrity of states and underline the inevitability
of Ukraine’s NATO membership.
Ukraine is in the process of implementing its first
Annual National Program with NATO. Its prospects for joining the Alliance in
the medium term are good, according to Arguchinskyi, who further stated that by
and large, Ukraine already meets the standards and criteria for a Membership
Action Plan (MAP), and contributes to NATO operations. Ukraine’s
membership will, in the end, be a purely political decision resting with NATO
member states, he said. Ukrainian officials called for a voice in the
ongoing discussion on a New Strategic Concept for NATO.
Arguchinskyi praised NATO’s Liaison Office in Ukraine as having provided
extremely valuable assistance in raising the profile of NATO in Ukraine.
ANTONOV AIRCRAFT TESTING FACILITY
The delegation had the oppprtunity to visit the ANTONOV
aircraft-testing facility outside of Kyiv. Marcin Koziel, Head of NATO Liaison
Office in Kyiv, briefed members on the technical arrangements in place which
allow NATO to lease Antonov aircraft to support various missions, and on the
Ukrainian contributions through these arrangements to NATO operations.
Aleksandr Kiva, Deputy Director of the Antonov facility, briefed members on the
range of aircraft Antonov produces and their use throughout the world,
characterizing his company’s products as providing reliable and rough airlifter
that can operate in extremely challenging conditions and carrying more cargo
than its competitors. The delegation learned that even in deepest crisis,
the Ukrainian government has remained a confirmed supporter of the Antonov
company.
The 72nd Rose-Roth Seminar
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The 72nd Rose-Roth Seminar
held in Lviv, Ukraine from 13-15 October demonstrated that NATO member
countries and their partners in Ukraine and Georgia are working to balance
between two competing principles: building a cooperative relationship with
Russia and protecting the right of sovereign states to chart their own foreign
policy course. The meetings focused on Ukraine but also included sessions on
Georgia, Moldova, and Belarus and energy security.
It became apparent that many states of
the former Soviet Union feel that they are under increasing pressure from
Russia. Ukrainians pointed to the dismissive statements from Moscow that
question the independence of the country, the troubling Russian practice of
issuing passports to ethnic Russians in the Crimean region and the use of
energy supplies as tool to gain influence over Ukrainian politics. Moldovans
spoke to the continued presence of Russian forces in the Transdnistrian region
that prop up an internationally unrecognized regime on their national
territory. Georgians underlined the ongoing efforts by Russia to create
separate states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia out of what is recognized as the
sovereign territory of Georgia. In all of those cases, the message was that
Russia’s ambition is to maintain weak states on its borders that it can
exercise significant influence over, particularly in terms of their foreign
policy. The main goal of this is to prevent those states from becoming part of
Euro-Atlantic structures, which is why the two NATO aspirants of Georgia and
Ukraine receive the bulk of this pressure.
There was broad agreement among the
participants that it is necessary to build a better relationship with Russia
based on mutual interests. The underlying concern, however, was that Russia’s
perceived strategic interests made it difficult to do this without sacrificing
core strategic interests of Ukraine, Georgia and other states in the region. As
Borys Tarasyuk, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on European
Integration and Founder and Director of the Institute of Euro-Atlantic
cooperation said, “Yes, we should have cooperation with Russia, but at what
price?”
The session focused on Ukraine showed
that it is making substantial progress on reaching NATO standards and the goals
set out in the Annual National Plan. At the same time, however, there needs to
be a national consensus on joining NATO and that is still lacking. As Simon
Lunn from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces
noted, “the whole country joins NATO, not just the military.” Although there is
a consensus among the major political parties about eventual NATO membership
that has not yet translated into broad popular support. However, Andrey Shkil,
head of the Ukrainian delegation to the NATO PA, underlined that popular support
has increased and that many current members of the Alliance had similar issues
with raising public awareness during their drive for accession.
The meetings centred on Moldova and
Belarus showed that Russian pressure on its neighbours is not limited to those
states seeking NATO membership. Belarus, and until recently Moldova, were both
very sympathetic toward Moscow. Yet, according to Vlad Lupan, independent
expert, this did not prevent Russian actions in the separatist region of
Transdnistria, which ironically has pushed Moldova to adopt an increasingly
pro-western posture. Belarus is also adjusting its policies in an effort to
engage with the European Union. Taken together, these two cases may show that
Moscow’s treatment of its neighbours may be pushing them closer to Western
institutions.
Energy security and its role in the
region sparked considerable discussion among the participants. As Ferdinand
Pavel of the German Institute for Economic Research noted, the EU imports 35%
of its gas and 45% of its oil from Russia, much of it through pipelines that
cross Ukraine. This gives Russia significant leverage that it uses for
political as well as economic gain. Several Ukrainian participants noted that,
for example, much of Ukraine’s oil refining capacity has been bought by Russian
investors who let it sit dormant. Although this would not appear to make
economic sense, it has clear political advantages in that it forces Ukraine to
remain dependent on Russia.
The final session of the programme
focused on Georgia. Giorgi Baramidze, Vice Prime Minister of Georgia, spoke
about how Georgia is adopting “strategic patience” in its approach to Russia
following the 2008 war. He welcomed the report of the European Commission on
the events leading to the war and stressed that Georgia is more determined than
ever to make the necessary reforms to integrate into the European Union and
NATO. Georgia is making progress, both politically and economically according
to Ghia Nodia, Director of the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and
Development. Economically the country is doing relatively well in global
downturn and its free-market approach to foreign investment will remain in
place. Georgia, however, is still going through a period of political
maturation. The government has learned how to work better with the opposition,
but the real test of Georgian democracy will be when it has its first
constitutional transfer of power. One point that was clear from the discussion
is that the Georgian government and the general public is more determined now
to enter NATO and the EU than before the 2008 war.
INTRODUCTION
The 72nd Rose-Roth Seminar held in
Lviv, Ukraine from 13-15 October brought together 34 members of parliament
from 19 countries for three days of intensive discussion on Ukraine, as well as
sessions on Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and energy security. The seminar,
jointly organised with the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, gathered delegations from
NATO member states as well as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the Assembly of Kosovo, Moldova
and Georgia, together with representatives from research institutes,
non-governmental organizations and NATO.
The principal theme emerging from the
discussions was that NATO member countries and their partners in Ukraine and
Georgia are working to balance between two competing principles: building a
cooperative relationship with Russia and protecting the right of sovereign
states to chart their own foreign policy course.
UKRAINE AND NATO
Ukraine’s view
The Euro-Atlantic integration of
Ukraine remains one of the major priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy,
according to Mykhailo Osnach, Director, NATO Department, and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. In his keynote address, Mr.. Osnach suggested that
the euphoria of the first years after independence has calmed down, and the
Ukrainian state has recognized new challenges and threats; it gave up nuclear
weapons and maintained a huge military that it had inherited from the USSR.
Its movement towards NATO has included major reforms focused on modernizing the
armed forces, reforming the security sector, continuing its democratic
development, as well as building an efficient civil society and a modern market
economy. Ukraine’s achievements in these regards have been widely recognized.
Reviewing Ukraine’s official relations
with NATO, Mr.. Osnach pointed to a major step in the past year, when NATO at
the political level for the first time said it wished to see Ukraine as a
member state. In December last year, Ukraine was invited to engage in an
Annual National Programme (ANP) with NATO, which was approved in Ukraine in
August. The development of the 2010 ANP was underway, and included chapters on
the security sector, economy, judiciary, law and order and other areas. The
standards the ANP aims to meet are mostly non-military, according to Mr..
Osnach, and reforms to meet them should continue, despite the difficulties
posed by the economic crisis.
Ukraine’s ongoing co-operation with
NATO includes contributions to operations through peacekeeping forces and
strategic lift. The decision has also been taken to include Ukraine in the
NATO Response Force, and Ukraine is seeking to co-operate in such diverse areas
as the new threats of cyberdefence and piracy, as well as contributing to the
Franco-British helicopter initiative. Mr.. Osnach suggested giving new impetus
to traditional forms of co-operation such as joint exercises, resettlement of
ex-military and disposal of obsolete weapons and munitions. Mr.. Osnach
further called for NATO to invite Ukraine to play a more active role in the
ongoing transformation of the Alliance, specifically through discussion of
NATO’s new strategic concept.
Mr. Osnach also underlined that the
membership action plan (MAP) remains the only official channel to prepare
nations for membership. Therefore, the next stage for Ukraine should still be
MAP, even if at a later date, the ANP may be recognized as sufficient
preparation for membership.
Regarding Russia, Mr.. Osnach suggested
that it is in Ukraine’s interest for NATO and Russia to develop a partnership
and that Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations in no way endanger any third
country, including Russia. On the contrary, NATO membership for Ukraine would
be in Russia’s interest, as it would insure the stability of Ukraine and the
inclusion of another NATO member interested in close co-operation with Russia.
Addressing the issue of the Ukrainian
public’s view of NATO, Mr.. Osnach affirmed that when the political elites
reach consensus on NATO accession, public opinion will follow, as it has in
other countries. He suggested opinion had become more favourable towards NATO
since the Bucharest Summit declaration. Andrey Shkil, Head of the Ukrainian
delegation to the NATO PA, warned that while support for NATO is growing
(particularly among younger generations), if NATO countries keep Ukraine in a
waiting room, this process could come to a halt; there was urgency to fulfill
Ukraine’s aspirations before the Ukrainian public and political elite became
indifferent.
Professor Oleksiy Haran of the National
University "Kyiv Mohyla Academy", underlined the Ukrainian
responsibility to conduct reforms, and lamented the political leadership’s
inability to move decisively since the Orange Revolution. He also identified
three events that have forced Ukraine to reconsider its reliance on NATO
assurances. First was the Georgia war, and the participation of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet based in Sebastopol. Second was the Russian-Ukrainian gas war
in January, and the European position that this was a bilateral issue between
Ukraine and Russia. Third is the policy ‘reset’ declared by the Obama
administration towards Russia; without detailed information on the bilateral
US-Russia discussions, Ukrainians were left to wonder at whose expense such a reset
would come.
Looking forward, Mr. Haran warned of
two potential flashpoints in the Russia/Ukraine relationship: the Crimea, and
the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which remained unresolved due to
Russia’s refusal to begin negotiations on the terms of its withdrawal.
A NATO Perspective
The NATO perspective on co-operation
with Ukraine was provided by Marcin Koziel, Head of the NATO Liaison
Office in Kyiv. Mr. Koziel stated that Ukraine’s security and democratic
development remain crucial to the Allies. The strategic decision made by NATO
in Bucharest – that Ukraine and Georgia would one day be NATO members - was
reiterated at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit and the recent meeting of NATO Foreign
Ministers. Within the Alliance there is no debate about whether Ukraine will
become a member; rather it’s about the pace of the process.
Mr. Koziel further asserted that the
implementation of the Bucharest decisions is between NATO and Ukraine and up to
no other nation. The door of NATO remains open to any democracy ready to share
the benefits and burdens of membership, any democracy who wishes to become a
member and wishes to meet the criteria.
According to Mr. Koziel, there is no
other partner nation with whom NATO’s co-operation on security sector reform is
more vibrant and extensive, offering a range of unique, well funded and expert
advice and assistance by Allies to Ukraine. Ukraine’s current collaboration
with NATO includes an Annual National Program (ANP), which Marcin Koziel
characterized as essentially the same as the document that members of
Membership Action Plan agree with the Alliance. Ukraine also has the ability
to request a meeting of its joint Commission with NATO anytime it feels
threatened.
Mr. Koziel considered Ukraine’s
progress in reforms as mixed. While much had been accomplished by a number of
different ministries, Mr. Koziel expressed concern about the underfunding of
reforms, particularly in the security sector. He also underlined, on a
personal basis, the importance of Ukraine establishing a national consensus on
the most important issues on the national agenda, national security first and
foremost. He also advised doing everything possible to address corruption,
which invites external influence, and the putting in place on an urgent basis
of a well-functioning system of interagency co-operation and co-ordination to
implement ongoing reforms.
An Independent Assessment
In the second keynote address, a stark
view was expressed by James Sherr, the Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme
at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). Mr. Sherr
described Ukraine as entering an especially dangerous period in which it found
itself again between the east, west, and itself. For the first time since the
end of the cold war, all three factors are unfavourable.
Referencing Ukraine’s internal
paralysis, Mr. Sherr questioned whether Ukrainian leaders could pull together
at a critical moment and overcome the self-interests standing in the way of
urgent national tasks. In Ukraine, he asserted, it is easier to obstruct
governance than to govern. Ukraine needs not new elections but a new
constitution, he asserted.
Looking eastwards, Mr. Sherr saw a
dangerous Russia which does not believe in Ukraine’s independence to decide its
own fate. Mr. Sherr suggested Russian elites may seek to protect their
economic interests by the historically proven method of blocking reform of the
structural flaws in the Russian economy through the creation of international
turbulence.
And looking westwards, Mr. Sherr
asserted that the benefits of NATO membership are not as clearly available to
Ukraine as they have been in the past. The enlargement issue has moved lower
on NATO’s agenda; the Georgia war has had important ramifications; and there is
a growing perception in this part of the world that NATO members have become
less vigilant about their own standards.
As a result, Ukraine’s national
security establishment has come to four conclusions: in this part of this
world, borders are no longer sacrosanct; issues that appeared settled, like
Crimea, could be reopened at any time; war is possible here; and without the
Article 5 guarantee that comes with membership, there will be no Allied defence
of Ukraine.
Among the implications of these
conclusions is that Ukraine’s defence forces no longer need to be modeled after
NATO standards; small, highly motivated and equipped, well-financed forces are
fine for the Alliance context, but Ukrainian leaders increasingly see a large,
unprofessional force (that will be poorly equipped and un-financeable), coupled
with a short and medium-range missile system, as in their national interest.
Mr. Sherr called for the west to
maintain its interests and influence by being present and active in Ukraine,
committing political and moral resources as well as financial and demonstrating
expertise and leadership. He suggested talking less about membership and more
about integration, and re-centring the NATO-Ukraine relationship on delivering
real security to Ukraine.
UKRAINE AND ENERGY SECURITY
A panel chaired by Vahit Erdem, Head of
the Turkish delegation to the NATO PA, discussed Ukraine’s energy dependence on
Russia and its implications for the European Union. Andriy Chubyk from
Ukraine’s NOMOS Centre, outlined Ukraine’s current situation: domestic
production produces 1/5 of needs in oil and 1/3 in natural gas, ensuring
dependence on Russian supplies.
While Ukraine has put in place a number
of programs to address this problem (a national energy program for 1997-2010
envisioned a 50% reduction in imports of Russian gas), Mr. Chubyk stated that
the goal has never been achieved due to a lack of political will. For
instance, Ukraine failed to build strategic gas reserves, leading to increased
vulnerability to disruption. Another hurdle has been the privatization of
Ukrainian oil facilities into Russian hands, making them tools of Russian
pressure.
Ferdinand Pavel from the Berlin-based
German Institute for Economic Research brought a broader perspective on the
EU’s energy situation vis-à-vis the region. The gas conflicts involving
Ukraine have been a ‘wakeup call’ for policy makers. The EU should be
negotiating as a whole with Russia rather than on a country by country basis.
Mr. Pavel suggested mitigating risks by moving towards a global, fully
integrated market where flows are not ‘earmarked’; in such a system, if there
is a major supply disruption, the impact will be felt everywhere. He also
suggested that Russia itself faced problems in the energy sector, including
increasing competition from the Middle East, North Africa, and Liquefied
Natural Gas terminals, all eating into its market share in the EU. In
addition, Russia is losing domestic production capability (oil and gas fields)
due to its excessive focus on pipeline politics.
NATO, UKRAINE AND RELATIONS WITH
RUSSIA
Andrei Ryabov, an independent analyst
from the Carnegie Moscow Centre, described the official Russian position on
NATO-Ukraine relations. Outlining what he called the position of decision
makers in Russia, he suggested that they believe that without close and
exclusive relations with Ukraine (both political and economic), it will be very
difficult to implement Russian strategic goals in the post-Soviet space.
Ukraine joining NATO would be a very important threat to these interests; the
whole system of European security would be deeply imbalanced in favour of the
European community and Russia will lose its place, being pushed to the Asian
continent and losing its status as a European actor.
On the other hand, Russian
decision-makers also recognize that Russian resources to influence Ukrainian
domestic and foreign policy are ultimately limited. They have concluded
therefore that the best outcome regarding Ukrainian foreign policy is a
constant vacillation between Russia and the west.
Mr. Ryabov suggested that the new
dialogue advanced by NATO’s new Secretary General has opened possibilities in
its relations with Russia, but the problem is on what issues this dialogue will
be focused – whether on concrete issues like NATO enlargement, or generally on
a new security architecture for the continent based on the proposals made by
Russian President Medvedev. Nevertheless, he advocated seizing opportunities
for a renewed dialogue in order to establish an agenda for the future of this
interrelated set of relationships.
James Greene, Senior Advisor with the
Baltic - Black - Caspian Seas Region Initiative (and former Head of the NATO
Liaison Office in Kyiv) suggested that the west has lost the majority of its
influence with Russia, and is in danger of losing it completely with Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE). The more the west chases the sliver of influence it
has with Russia, the more it will lose CEE. Instead, he recommended a strategy
of engaging CEE and bringing it into the west’s collective efforts to engage
Russia.
Most of the west’s post-cold war
assumptions about Russia have proven false, according to Mr. Greene, including
the idea that Russian values would converge with the west’s as a natural result
of reforms and economic ties. Indeed, Russia’s movement towards the west has
been limited; on the economic level, western business advantages have been
limited by a merger of business and intelligence sectors in Russia: the
“Coca-Cola effect” was countered by factors such as state control of the
media.
Mr. Greene warned that the Russian
elite has achieved one of its strategic goals being able to ‘hurt’ the west
geopolitically. He therefore recommended taking real actions to protect against
Russian efforts to undermine security in the region, while maintaining contact
in the hope of eventual convergence. He suggested NATO policy had not caught
up to this changing paradigm.
On the Ukraine-NATO partnership, Mr.
Greene suggested that NATO is losing influence and interest, given that many in
the west are convinced Ukraine is unable to solve its internal weaknesses. He
recommended focusing away from issues of membership and Article 5 and instead
on real security challenges through honest and open consultations on the
threats Ukraine faces. Mr. Greene praised the ANP as an excellent framework,
deserving of more investment and intellectual resources.
Discussion covered several points,
including the problem of Russian non-reconciliation with its own Soviet
history; Mr. Ryabov confirmed that a dialogue on historical issues would remain
extremely difficult and no challenge to legitimacy of the government will be
entertained. Assen Agov, Assembly Vice President, related the Bulgarian
experience and suggested there were no ‘new architects’ in Moscow with whom to
dialogue on a changed relationship. Mr. Greene confirmed that he saw no real
common ground; Russian and western interests are incompatible and we need to
face that, he stated. Mr. Ryabov warned, however, against a policy that would
lead to an isolation of Russia, which would have dangerous consequences not
just for Russia but for the region as a whole.
Responding to questions on possible
Russian co-operation to address Iran’s nuclear program, Mr. Greene stated that
Russia may have made the decision to allow proliferation to gain tactical
advantage (through higher energy prices, involving the US in another conflict);
Russian behaviour on this issue called into question some of our most basic assumptions,
according to James Greene. Mr. Ryabov warned against overestimating the links
between the Russian security sector and Iran.
MOLDOVA
A panel moderated by, Ostap Semerak, a
Ukrainian member of parliament reviewed political developments in Moldova.
Panelists agreed that Russia is using its influence in Transdnistria to assert
its role in the region.
Ukrainian national Oleksandr Sushko,
Scientific Director of the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Co‑operation,
explained that Moldova has the second longest state border with Ukraine, about
1400 km. About 450 km of this is the border with Transdnistria. Mr. Sushko
lamented that there is no legitimate partner with which to co-operate on border
issues along this section, resulting in a vulnerability to problems such as
cross border crime and smuggling.
Mr. Sushko put the border in the
context of the bigger picture of the separatist regions which for a long time
have been referred to as the ‘frozen conflicts.’ He suggested that western
institutions, including NATO, were playing only very limited roles in the
resolution of these situations because of their increased focus on remote areas
of the world like Afghanistan. Russia, on the other hand, has monopolized all
peacekeeping efforts in the region, impacting efforts to resolve the
conflicts.
Looking forward, Mr. Sushko suggested
that there are no signs that Russia will change its position on Transdnistria.
Russia might accept that Moldova drifts towards Europe, but without
Transdnistria, which would in this case remain a semi-sovereign area fully
aligned with Russia. This would be a ‘Kaliningrad-like’ tool for Moscow to
pressure Ukraine.
Ukraine and NATO have aligning
interests, according to Mr. Sushko: they should seek Moldova’s territorial
integrity, but not at the price of Moldova’s western aspirations. He advocated
a greater role for the EU over the medium term.
Independent Moldovan analyst Vlad Lupan
reviewed the history of the Transdnistrian conflict and suggested the influence
of Russia means that this conflict will remain frozen for at least another 10
years. While the Moldovan side has had several changes of position due to
changing political circumstances, the Russian interest in Moldova has remained
constant, with Moscow asserting its belief that this is its sphere of
influence. Mr. Lupan argued that Russia has no interest in solving this issue;
for Moscow, Transdnistria is an ‘aircraft carrier with spikes in both Moldova
and Ukraine,’ he stated. Mr. Lupan also pointed to increased EU involvement as
potentially helping to resolve the situation, specifically calling for an
expanded mandate for the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Moldova and
Ukraine.
A Moldovan member of parliament
suggested that the way forward lay in making efforts to have Russian troops and
munitions withdrawn; demonstrating to Trandsnitrians that life in Moldova was
getting better and better; and ensuring that promises made by European partners
(such as a visa-free regime) during the election campaign will be fulfilled.
BELARUS
A session on Belarus moderated by Leon
Benoit, Head of the Canadian delegation to the NATO PA, began with Mr. Benoit’s
recollection that Belarus became an associate member of Assembly after the
collapse of the USSR, but its membership was suspended in 1997 as result of
President Lukaschenko’s antidemocratic measures.
Belarusian national Pavel Daneyko,
Director of Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Centre, reported that
Belarus is divided between those who support European integration and those who
support integration with Russia. He saw little prospect of this divide being
overcome; as a result, Belarus will have to pursue a policy of national
independence and balancing of its foreign policy between Europe and Russia.
Even so, Mr. Daneyko suggested that a
number of factors suggested a possible movement towards a European
perspective. These included the fact that 50% of exports are aimed at the EU;
that European values are gradually being implemented and promulgated in Belarusian
legislation; and that relations with the EU are improving generally, both
politically and economically.
Domestically, Mr. Daneyko saw reforms
as irreversible. President Lukashenko will have to continue economic reforms
because he remains an electoral leader and seeks the support of his society; he
has achieved popular acquiescence in the past by providing stable incomes.
Balazs Jarabik, of the Kyiv-based
Foundation for International Relations and External Dialogue, provided an
international perspective on the situation in Belarus. While acknowledging the
view of Belarus as ‘the last dictatorship in Europe,’ he offered a different
perspective: Belarus as the only conflict-free country in the region, with
great cohesion, a growing national sense of identity, a growing civil society,
and the only country in the region that could take up the EU acquis and
implement it.
Russia should see Belarus in a positive
light, according to Mr. Jarabik: it is guaranteed to remain “NATO-free”, and a
very reliable political partner for Russia. Belarus’ complete energy
dependence on Russia also represents a big threat for Lukaschenko and allows
Russia to focus less on Belarus than on Ukraine or Georgia.
Next year’s presidential elections
offer a means for the west to influence political developments in Belarus: Mr.
Jarabik recommended that the EU should offer full engagement on the condition
of free and fair elections. He also suggested increased contacts at all levels
between the EU and Belarus. These policies could potentially result in the
beginning of Belarus’ technical integration with the EU within a year or two.
During a lively exchange, speakers
discussed the extent to which current political changes are a result of
economic dynamics and/or of Lukashenko’s negotiations with the EU. The
speakers confirmed that the idea of a Belarus-Russia union is now only an empty
shell. Mr. Jarabik also related that Russian pressure had resulted in military
exercises on Belarusian territory this summer, exercises that had not been held
for four years. Interestingly, according to Jarabik, some of the Russian
troops have yet to return to Russia. Mr. Danyeko suggested Mr. Lukashenko
would seek the highest possible concessions from Russia for any possible
recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence.
GEORGIA
Giorgi Baramidze, Vice Prime Minister
and State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Georgia,
stated that Russia currently occupies more than 20% of Georgian territory, and
continues to violate the cease-fire agreement, most notably not withdrawing its
forces to the status quo ante. Four military bases are being constructed.
Russia has deployed almost 10,000 soldiers in the occupied regions, and
these forces occupy positions only 40 km from Tbilisi. Most importantly,
military operations were conducted well after the ceasefire was agreed.
The war and its aftermath have been the
culmination of decades of Russian policy aiming at preventing the democratic
development and the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Georgia, according to the Vice
Prime Minister. Mr. Baramidze cited the EU-mandated Tagliavini report as
showing a well-planned, well-executed Russian operation beginning well before
August 7, and rejecting Russia’s justification of ‘humanitarian grounds’ for
the invasion. He stated that the report confirms that Russia broke the UN
charter by aggressing a sovereign state and that Russia’s recognition of the
regions is unlawful interference in Georgia’s internal affairs.
Mr. Baramidze called for a unanimous,
firm position by the whole international community, to include continuing the
non-recognition policy; and the establishment of a strong presence by the
European Union Monitoring mission, especially after Russia blocked OSCE and UN presence
in Georgia. Russia must be convinced to abide by the six-point ceasefire.
Georgia, for its part, has devised a strategy to alleviate the difficult living
conditions of the populations on the occupied territories, with initiatives in
areas such as socio-economic and trade relations, health care, heritage, and
civil society development.
This conflict will not have a
short-term solution, according to Mr. Baramidze, and the future of these
populations should not become hostage to the political situation. Georgia must
exercise strategic patience; Mr. Baramidze hoped that friendly nations will
support Georgia’s efforts in this regard, at a minimum through the creation of
new mechanisms for Georgia’s security prospects and economic and democratic
developments.
Addressing Georgia’s internal political
turbulences, Mr. Baramidze stated that during these situations, the Georgian
government exercised constructive engagement, dialogue, and restraint. The
government offered a comprehensive set of proposals, a so-called second wave of
democratic initiatives, and invited the opposition to discuss a new electoral
code. The government had also offered those who refused their parliamentary
seats the opportunity to take up their mandates to participate within the system
constructively.
In response to questions, Baramidze
elaborated on what was offered regarding domestic political reforms, stating
that the government had suggested the establishment of a new constitutional
commission that is drafting a new constitution based on a more balanced power
structure (to be delivered at the end of next spring or earlier), strengthening
the parliament and making the system more transparent. New rules on the state
media are also under discussion, as well as the direct election of the mayor of
Tbilisi. All of these and other measures should lead to a more harmonious
political debate in the capital and help stability in Georgia, also leading to
more support from the west and hopefully therefore progress on the problem of
the occupied territories.
Mr. Baramidze concluded by stating that
NATO’s Bucharest decisions had given Georgia a good way forward. Georgia in
2009 completed the first cycle of its Annual National Plan, continuing its
reform processes despite the political crises. The NATO Georgia Commission was
also positive step. These are adequate measures to technically meet NATO’s
membership criteria within two or three years, according to Mr. Baramidze; NATO
members will then have to make a political decision on when the Alliance will
take Georgia in. Certainly there should be no Russian veto and no condition
placed by NATO members that Russian forces would have to be withdrawn: this
would give Russia a de facto veto and would give them incentive to keep the
forces in Georgia.
A panel moderated by NATO PA Vice‑President
and member of the Georgia‑NATO Inter-parliamentary Council
Assen Agov further debated the political position of Georgia roughly one
year after the 2008 war.
Ghia Nodia, the Director of the
Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development in Tbilisi suggested
that even if the period of November 2007-June 2009 has been the most difficult
in the recent Georgian history since the early 1990s, the damage from the
crises has not been as bad as one might expect under the circumstances. The
main achievement has been that the country has stayed the course on the main
issues. He used the analogy of a tough test drive for a new car model; while
not all systems worked, the model proved viable even if it needs lots of work.
Professor Hryhoriy Perepylytsya of the
Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine suggested that because of the geopolitical
transformation of the international system, the Georgian conflict won’t be the
last of its type. Russia has seen a window of opportunity to restore its great
power status. It believes some of the post-Soviet states are not sustainable,
and saw Georgia as a link in an energy chain it wanted to disrupt. As a result
of what the Professor called its military victory and political victory over
the west, its belief in the benefits of military force has grown. Russia will
demand, for co-operation on Afghanistan and Iran, an end to support for the
sovereignty of post-Soviet states and refuse their European integration.
Finally, Georgian MP David
Darchiashvili, suggested that a compromise between anti‑Western Russia
and modernizing Georgia is impossible. Going forward, the west will have to
make co-operation with Russia conditional; make progress on the occupied
territories; and speed Georgian reforms, including in the security sector,
based on a thorough analysis of the spectrum of threats it faces. In sum, the
international community must follow through with its declarations.
CLOSING KEYNOTE
Simon Lunn, former NATO Parliamentary
Assembly Secretary General and now Senior Fellow at Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), drew some personal conclusions
from the seminar’s exchanges.
The issues raised throughout the
seminar had been a useful reminder that even if the Alliance has become aware
of global challenges, symbolized by Afghanistan, NATO must still tend to its
own backyard. The inherent instability in this region – the ‘belt of
conflicts’ – points to the simple overarching theme of the discussions: what
do we do about Russia?
It was clear that Ukraine had made
great progress since 1991, in areas of democratic institutions and freedoms, as
well as strong contributions to NATO. Speakers had recommended three areas to
focus on going forward, including corruption, coordination, and developing a
national consensus. This last area was especially important in that it’s not
just the government that joins NATO but whole societies. He recalled an
important point made on Georgia, which was to ensure that the withdrawal of
Russian forces does not become a condition for NATO membership, causing the
enlargement process to become hostage to Russian choices.
Mr. Lunn further summarized the “Russia
factor”, which featured two competing pressures: the recognition that long term
security and stability in Europe was impossible without co-operation with
Russia, versus the principle of the right of countries to choose their own
destinies. In other words, ‘Yes, co-operation, but at what cost?’
NATO itself had been affected by
enlargement and partnerships, which have left grey areas of security in Europe.
Mr. Lunn feared that Allies have dangerously allowed Article 5 to become
somehow less clear. He called for reinforcement of the clear treaty statement
of Article 5, which is not about capabilities but rather about solidarity and
commitment. Crucially, it should not be assumed to extend to countries other
than full members. Of course, measures that will have to be taken to reassure
threatened Allies could be thought by some to be provocative; this will have to
be balanced.
Mr. Lunn finally suggested that the issue of
co-operation and partnership with Russia will have to be a central element of
the debate NATO’s new strategic concept. While this subject is not yet a
schism in the Alliance, it does pose serious problems. Russia does not make
life easier for those nations advocating co-operation, through numerous
examples of unacceptable behaviour. We can have no illusions that, with the
current Russian attitude, future justified enlargements of the Alliance will be
without challenges. Even so, Mr. Lunn commented, for Ukraine and Georgia, the
messages of the seminar have been threefold: ‘patience;’ ‘stay the course, keep
knocking on the door;’ and ‘help us by being a part of the solution on
relations with Russia, which will help facilitate a consensus on a common
future.’
Respectfully submitted,
Mr. Leon Benoit, M.P.,
Chair
Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (NATO PA)