

Canadian NATO
Parliamentary Association



Association parlementaire
canadienne de l'OTAN

Report of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association

22nd Annual Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum

**Washington, D.C, United States of America
From December 5 to 7, 2022**

REPORT

The [Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association](#) has the honour to report on its participation in the 22nd Annual Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum (the Forum), which took place in Washington D.C., United States (U.S) from 5 to 7 December 2022. The Canadian delegation comprised [Julie Dzerowicz](#), MP (the Head of Delegation); Senator [Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu](#); Senator [Donna Dasko](#); [Charlie Angus](#), MP; and [Christine Normandin](#), MP.

The delegation was accompanied by Andrés León, Association Advisor.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

Every year, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) organizes a Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum in Washington, D.C. It is hosted by the [National Defense University](#) and co-sponsored by the [Atlantic Council](#). The 22nd Annual Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum¹ (the Forum) was the first forum to have been attended in-person by Canadian parliamentarians since the pandemic began in 2020.

One of the objectives of the Forum, which was first held in 2001, is to explore the state of transatlantic relations, and help identify ways to address divergences in the way in which North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries approach key security issues. Moreover, it gives NATO PA legislators the opportunity to hear from, and hold discussions with, U.S congressional representatives, U.S. administration officials, academics, and policy experts on certain defence and security issues². These discussions were held under Chatham House Rules.

Introduction

During the 2022 Forum, legislators from multiple NATO countries, including Canada, attended 12 sessions on several topics of interest to NATO (or the Alliance) and the U.S. One of those topics was Russia's most recent and full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Other topics that were discussed at the 2022 Forum included:

- defending enduring transatlantic values in a competitive strategic environment;
- the threat posed by autocracies and authoritarian countries to democratic values and the rules-based international order;
- the human rights situation in Russia, particularly in terms of the Kremlin's persecution and oppression of Russians opposed to the current regime led by President Vladimir Putin;
- international sanctions against Russia; energy security;
- the Indo-Pacific region and relations with China;
- Arctic Security; and

¹ On 12 December 2022, The NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) put out a news release highlighting the outcomes of the 22nd Annual Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum. For more information, see NATO PA, [Transatlantic lawmakers discuss Allied response to Russia's war against Ukraine, China's challenge and other shared priorities](#), News release, 12 December 2022.

² NATO PA, [Transatlantic Relations](#)

- the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO.

U.S. and allied responses to the war in Ukraine

Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine was a key theme of the Forum. As of 6 February 2023, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights had recorded about 18,800 civilian casualties in Ukraine since the beginning of the war, a figure that included more than 7,200 deaths³. Meanwhile, as of 10 February 2023, there were more than 8.0 million Ukrainian refugees living across Europe; another 5.4 million Ukrainians were internally displaced.⁴

Although NATO, as a defensive alliance, has provided non-lethal assistance to Ukraine, a number of Allies have provided significant amounts of military equipment and other assistance to the country, including increasingly lethal and modern weapons. NATO countries have also sought to provide Ukrainian armed forces personnel with winter gear in anticipation of the upcoming winter months. As well, Canada, the U.S. and other Allies have trained Ukrainian armed forces personnel since before the start of the current war in Ukraine.

Delegates were told that Russia has failed to achieve one of its objectives: the removal of the Ukrainian government led by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. As well, they were informed that Russia's defence sector has lost a large portion of its production capabilities as result of the most recent war in Ukraine, and that in certain cases, microchips were being extracted from refrigerators and other appliances to manufacture new Russian weapons.

One U.S. administration official remarked that NATO countries can help Ukraine to transition from Soviet-era weaponry to NATO weaponry, while also ensuring that NATO can adapt to address new and emerging security challenges stemming from the war. Moreover, the same official characterized defence and deterrence as two of NATO's significant objectives in terms of transatlantic security.

Defending enduring transatlantic values

Delegates were told that the current Russian regime poses a danger to European security, and that Russia's invasion of Ukraine represents a "wake up call" for NATO countries. Moreover, one expert observed that the concept of "transatlanticism" is based on defending democratic values against authoritarianism and autocratic regimes.

Another expert highlighted Latvia's accession to NATO, which occurred in 2004, after NATO leaders invited that country, as well as Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and Slovenia, to join NATO. That same expert reminded the delegates that Latvia and other countries in Eastern Europe suffered under the "yoke" of the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, and that these countries have expressed their support for Ukraine's accession to NATO.

³ United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Ukraine: civilian casualty update 6 February 2023](#), News release, 6 February 2023.

⁴ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, [Ukraine – Situation Report](#), accessed 3 March 2023.

The transatlantic relationship

Delegates were informed about how on 29-30 November 2022, NATO foreign ministers met in Bucharest, Romania to discuss several key defence and security issues, including China's coercive policies and actions, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the current security situation in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea regions.⁵ Following the conclusion of that ministerial meeting, the NATO foreign ministers issued a statement that, among other matters:

- condemns Russia's acts of aggression and human rights violations in Ukraine;
- expresses solidarity with the Polish people following a 15 November 2022 Russian missile attack against Ukraine that resulted in the death of two people in Poland;
- reiterates NATO's commitment to providing support to Ukraine; highlights Finland's and Sweden's participation at the ministerial meeting;
- highlights Finland's and Sweden's participation at the ministerial meeting;
- characterizes NATO as a defensive alliance; and
- reaffirms NATO's "open door policy," which states that the Alliance is open "to any European country in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area."

A U.S. administration official told the delegates that, as of 5 December 2022, the U.S. had provided or committed approximately US\$19.0 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since 2014. The official also mentioned NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), which is "designed to support Ukraine's ability to provide for its own security and to implement wide-ranging reforms based on NATO standards, Euro-Atlantic principles and best practices." CAP was established in 2016.⁶

Moreover, the official stated that, since Russia's February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, China has increased its cooperation with Russia, including in terms of military exercises. The official then stated that despite China's efforts to collect intelligence and data on NATO countries and disseminate disinformation targeting certain Allies, there are still avenues for cooperation with China on several issues, including climate change. However, the official indicated that China is attempting to reform the UN, and the international rules-based order.

In terms of defence spending, the official urged NATO countries to continue increasing their defence spending to meet the 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) spending guideline. Adopted during the 2014 NATO Wales Summit, the Defence Investment Pledge called on all NATO countries to meet a NATO-agreed spending guideline by 2024: 2% of GDP allocated to defence, and 20% of annual defence spending allocated to major new equipment.⁷

⁵ NATO, [NATO foreign ministers set to address more support for Ukraine](#), News release, 29 November 2022.

⁶ NATO, "Practical support to Ukraine – the Comprehensive Assistance Package," [Relations with Ukraine](#).

⁷ NATO, [NATO Wales Summit 2014](#).

When asked by a delegate about the impact of the current state of U.S. democracy on transatlantic relations, the official argued that the results of the 2022 U.S. Senate and House of Representatives elections were good for U.S. democracy. The official also remarked that the electoral defeat of multiple candidates who had denied the results of the 2020 U.S. presidential election demonstrated that small “L” liberal democracy can work.

Finally, the official discussed energy security, and recognized the commitment of certain Allies to continue providing support to Ukraine despite having to contend with high energy prices and the economic consequences of the pandemic. As well, the official underscored that both Canada and the U.S. are affected by European Security, and cautioned that China is “taking notes” on how Allies are responding to Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine

One expert claimed that certain Allies have underestimated Ukraine’s ability to counter Russia’s acts of aggression, and characterized President Zelenskyy as a major civilian war leader, who can be compared to other wartime civilian leaders, such as British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The expert also noted that the U.S., other NATO countries and Ukraine have carried out actions to counter Russian disinformation about its invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, the expert maintained that military supply is critical to supporting Ukraine’s war efforts.

Another expert stressed that Russia should continue to be treated by the international community as a “pariah state,” and maintained that relations between Russia and NATO “should not be business as usual.” The expert also advocated for more actions to be taken by Allies to counter Russian disinformation and said that these actions should be taken proactively.

Finally, with a focus on NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroups in the Alliance’s Eastern flank, one expert suggested that NATO needs to transition from forward presence to forward defence. As of 5 December 2022, NATO had eight eFP multinational and combat-ready battlegroups in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. NATO’s eight eFP battlegroups are currently led by the following eight Framework Nations: ⁸

- Canada, which leads the eFP battlegroup in Latvia;
- Czechia, which leads the eFP battlegroup in Slovakia;
- France, which leads the eFP battlegroup in Romania;
- Germany, which leads the eFP battlegroup in Lithuania;
- Hungary, which leads the eFP battlegroup in Hungary;
- Italy, which leads the eFP battlegroup in Bulgaria;
- the United Kingdom, which leads the eFP battlegroup in Estonia; and
- the U.S., which leads the eFP battlegroup in Poland.

Challenges to global democracy

Since before the beginning of its war on Ukraine, Russia has been strengthening its bilateral relations with China, including in terms of international trade and defence

⁸ NATO, [NATO’s military presence in the east of the Alliance](#).

cooperation. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, between 2014 and 2020, the value of Russian merchandise exports to China increased from US\$37.4 billion to US\$49.1 billion, while the value of Chinese merchandise exports to Russia increased from US\$50.9 billion to US\$54.9 billion. Additionally, since 2003, China and Russia have increased the number of joint military exercises held in the Indo-Pacific region.⁹

An expert told the delegates that Western democracies should prepare themselves for long-term competition with autocracies. The expert contended that the U.S. and its allies must find venues to address new challenges to democracy, including by establishing new entities that reflect allied cooperation in defence, democracy and security. In particular, the expert proposed the establishment of a Group of Ten that would comprise an alliance of democracies, and urged Western democracies to work alongside the world's largest democracy – India – to promote democratic values.

Another presenter spoke about the state of human rights in Russia. Concerning President Putin's persecution of Russians opposed to the current regime, the presenter mentioned that Alexei Navalny, Vladimir Kara-Murza and other political opponents are being arbitrarily detained by Russian security forces. Since 24 February 2022, more than 19,000 people have been arbitrarily detained in Russia.¹⁰ Moreover, the presenter said that detained political opponents in Russia are often held in inhumane conditions.

The delegates were informed that Russia has implemented legislation and other measures to silence opposition movements to the current regime. Environmental activists have also been punished for opposing Russia's most recent invasion of Ukraine. In certain cases, these activists have been stripped of their citizenships. As well, several media outlets from Western countries have been banned from Russia, and Russian state-owned media outlets have portrayed opponents to President Putin as "crazy."

A presenter described President Putin as a "bully." Moreover, the presenter called on the international community, including NATO countries, to:

- refrain from isolating Russian civil society, and provide it with reliable information;
- develop a concerted strategy to provide support to opponents of the current Russian regime, including journalists, academics and human rights activists;
- support independent Russian media outlets that seek to provide reliable news and information; and
- work together to identify human right violations in Russia.

Finally, the presenter predicted Russia could experience a period of chaos when President Putin's rule (eventually) ends, and his subordinates struggle to win control of the country's government. The presenter then added that Russia has been using Belarus as testing ground in terms of the carrying out of acts of oppression against political opponents and civil society.

⁹ Lindsay Maizland, [China and Russia: Exploring Ties Between Two Authoritarian Powers](#), Council on Foreign Relations, 14 June 2022.

¹⁰ International Bar Association, [Interview with Evgenia Kara-Murza, wife of jailed Russian opposition leader](#), 29 November 2022

The Economic fall out of the war in Ukraine

Since 2014, Canada, the U.S., the European Union (EU) and other Allies and partners have imposed multiple rounds of sanctions and other restrictive measures on Russia.¹¹ In his May 2022 appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, Canada's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council – David Angell – remarked that “[o]ne of the objectives of sanctions has been to degrade Russia’s military capabilities by cutting access of its defence sector to western technology.”¹²

At the 2022 Forum, delegates were reminded that the three objectives of imposing sanctions on Russia were deterrence, negotiated leverage, and punishment. One expert argued that sanctions had not been effective in deterring Russia from invading Ukraine and continuing its acts of aggression, but indicated that they were being used effectively to punish Russia. The expert also spoke about actions carried out by the U.S., Canada and other Group of Seven (G7) countries to remove Russian banks from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) messaging system. The expert then noted that the G7 took actions to block most uses of financial funds in Russia, and said that Russia had not expected the G7 to present a united bloc. As well, the expert drew attention to the U.S. decision to introduce export controls to prevent Russia from importing technologies that contain U.S. inputs, such as microchips.

Another presenter discussed efforts made by some members of the international community to aid Ukraine with its reconstruction efforts. According to the World Bank, the current war in Ukraine had has a major impact on the country’s poverty levels, with an additional 8 million Ukrainians now living in poverty. Moreover, the World Bank estimates that Ukraine’s GDP decreased by 35% in 2022. The presenter also attributed the destruction of about 40% of residential units in all of Ukraine to the military attacks carried out by Russia throughout the war.

Discussing financial support for Ukraine, the presenter noted that a total of US\$17.8 billion in financial aid has been mobilized through the World Bank, and that multiple pledges have been made by several countries to support Ukraine financially. The presenter also estimated that Ukraine will need US\$3-4 billion per month in economic aid to maintain essential public services, including pensions, health, education and social protection. Additionally, the presenter outlined a series of World Bank initiatives to help Ukraine’s neighbouring countries manage the inflow of Ukrainian and other refugees, who have been displaced by the war.

¹¹ See Government of Canada, [Sanctions – Russian invasion of Ukraine](#); [European Council, EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine \(since 2014\)](#); and U.S. Department of the Treasury, [Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions](#)

¹² House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE), [Evidence](#), 2 May 2022, 1110 (Mr. David Angell, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Joint Delegation of Canada to NATO).

Shared energy challenges

Another topic discussed at the Forum was energy security. Following Russia's most recent invasion of Ukraine, a number of European countries have sought to diversify their energy imports. Many of these countries have been dependent on Russia for oil and gas imports and are now seeking to replace them with imports from other countries.

An expert remarked that the U.S. is becoming an important energy exporter to the EU, and noted that, in some cases, energy transition in Europe has already begun. The expert also told delegates that price caps on oil and gas could affect people differently and may only benefit those with higher incomes. Furthermore, the expert argued that any export restrictions on natural gas and oil imports could "hurt" European energy security.

Another presenter outlined the Biden Administration's actions in responding to the global energy crisis and climate change. These actions include increasing the supply of U.S. gas to Europe to replace Russian gas, promoting international actions to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, implementing and designing measures to create U.S. jobs in the clean energy sector, and reducing dependence on China for key products. The presenter also indicated that, by 2030, the U.S. aims to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 50-52%. The presenter then responded to questions from several delegates, including on whether the European energy crisis has accelerated the current energy transition in Europe.

China and a changing Asian landscape

At the Forum, the head of Canada's delegation to the NATO PA, Julie Dzerowicz, MP, moderated a panel on the changing security landscape in the Indo-Pacific region, which included discussions on China's assertiveness in the region and the need to cooperate more closely with regional partners, such as Australia and Japan.¹³

An expert discussed U.S. trade relations with other Indo-Pacific jurisdictions. The expert argued that Indo-Pacific jurisdictions that are allied with the U.S. tend to seek more robust trade agreements. He also expressed his regret about the withdrawal of the U.S. from the *Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)*, which is a trade agreement among Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore and Viet Nam.¹⁴ The CPTPP entered into force on 30 December 2018 for Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore, on 14 January 2019 for Viet Nam, on 19 September 2021 for Peru, on 29 November 2022 for Malaysia, and on 21 February 2023 for Chile. Since February 2021, the governments of several jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, have applied – or have expressed an interest in applying – to accede to the CPTPP.¹⁵

¹³ Parliament of Canada, [Members of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association participate at the 22nd Annual Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum, and meet with Canada's Military Attaché to the U.S. and members of the Canadian diplomatic corps in Washington D.C.](#), News release, 9 December 2022.

¹⁴ Government of Canada, [Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership \(CPTPP\)](#).

¹⁵ United Kingdom Parliament, House of Lords Library, [UK membership of the trans-pacific trade agreement](#).

Another panellist spoke about U.S.-China political and economic relations, the ongoing US-China trade war, China's increased presence in the Arctic, and that country's assertiveness in the South China Sea.

Finally, an expert noted that, among other key developments, NATO leaders adopted the Alliance's new Strategic Concept at the June 2022 summit in Madrid. Unlike the 2010 Strategic Concept, the 2022 version mentions China. It recognizes the challenges posed to transatlantic security by the rise of an increasingly assertive and powerful China, and identifies that country's "stated ambitions and coercive policies" as a challenge to NATO's values, security and interests.¹⁶

The corruption-security nexus and U.S. foreign policy

Discussing U.S. efforts to address corruption, a U.S. administration official emphasized the need for the U.S. and its Allies to find willing partners to collaborate on the implementation of anti-corruption measures. The official added that the current U.S. global defence program review will be strengthened to include anti-corruption measures. Moreover, the official mentioned that, within the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, the U.S. congress has provided security assistance to Ukraine that, among other things, requires the Ukrainian government to address corruption.

The U.S. administration official then answered questions from several delegates, including on Ukrainian and U.S. efforts to counter Russian disinformation on the war in Ukraine, and about Ukraine's anti-corruption measures.

Nordic and Arctic security challenges and NATO's evolving Northern vocation

Arctic security and Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO were among the themes that delegates, and panellists discussed at the Forum. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service, the Arctic has often been characterized as a region of low tension and cooperation, particularly among the eight Arctic countries.¹⁷ However, rising geopolitical tensions in the context of the most recent war in Ukraine is one of several factors affecting Arctic cooperation and security. As well, climate change is a growing security issue in the Arctic as melting permafrost and diminishing sea ice have contributed to increased interest in – and accessibility to – the region.¹⁸

Turning the discussion to the development and implementation of U.S. Arctic policies, one academic highlighted the involvement of numerous stakeholders, including various levels of the U.S. federal government, public servants and political actors. Moreover, the academic added that certain local and Indigenous governments in the United States have also developed and implemented strategies and policies on the Arctic.

Delegates were told that the past three U.S. administrations – the Obama Administration (2009-2016), the Trump Administration (2017-2020) and the Biden Administration (2021-

¹⁶ NATO, [NATO 2022 Strategic Concept](#).

¹⁷ The eight Arctic countries are: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. See Ronald O'Rourke et al., [Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress](#), U.S. Congressional Research Service, 24 March 2022, pp. 19–20

¹⁸ Wilfrid Greaves, ["Arctic break up: Climate change, geopolitics, and the fragmenting Arctic security region,"](#) 2019 Arctic Yearbook, 2019.

present) – had each developed their own arctic strategies. One of the panellists highlighted some of the Arctic priorities included in those strategies, including:

- fostering Arctic cooperation;
- pursuing mineral extraction; and
- ensuring U.S. power projection.

Moreover, an academic stated that, between 2020 and 2021, the United States released three Arctic strategies for the six branches of the country's armed forces, and added that the Biden Administration released its *Strategy for the Arctic Region* in October 2022.¹⁹

A panellist remarked that in response to Russia's renewed aggression against Ukraine, Sweden and Finland – which have both pursued a policy of military nonalignment since the Second World War – applied to join NATO in May 2022. The panellist confirmed that, as of 7 December 2022, 28 of 30 NATO countries had ratified the accession protocols of the two Nordic countries.²⁰ The panellist also described Finland and Sweden as important NATO partners, noting that Finland's and Sweden's addition to the Alliance will strengthen NATO's Northern and Eastern flanks, as well as bring expertise on the Arctic and countering hybrid threats. Moreover, an expert claimed that Finland has the largest artillery force in Western Europe, and observed that the two Nordic countries have implemented several measures to improve their military capabilities since the mid-2010s.

Finally, several delegates asked questions of the panellists, including on the impact that the construction of military infrastructure and resource extraction has on Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, and on whether Arctic countries like Canada have taken enough actions to strengthen security in the region.

OTHER MEETINGS

On 5 November 2022, the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association met at the [Embassy of Canada to the United States](#), with Sara D. Cohen, Deputy Head of Mission (Foreign Policy & National Security), Major-General Michel-Henri St-Louis, Canada's Military Attaché to the U.S., and other Canadian government officials. Representatives from the embassy briefed the Canadian delegation on several issues, including Canada-U.S. bilateral relations, the Indo-Pacific region and Arctic Security. The purpose of the briefing was to help prepare the Canadian delegates for their participation in the 22nd

¹⁹ The U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Space Force are the six branches of the U.S. armed forces. See U.S., Army, [Regaining Arctic Dominance](#), 19 January 2021, pp. 28–38; U.S., Department of the Air Force, [The Department of the Air Force: Arctic Strategy](#), 21 July 2020, p. 7; and U.S., Department of the Navy, *A Blue Arctic: A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic*, 5 January 2021, p. 10.

²⁰ More recently, as of 3 March 2023, the following 28 NATO members had completed their respective parliamentary procedures for the ratification of Finland's and Sweden's accession protocols: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The two countries that have not yet ratified the two Nordic countries' accession protocols are Hungary and Türkiye. See NATO PA, [Finland & Sweden Accession](#).

Annual Transatlantic Forum and inform them about significant issues in defence and security.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The 22nd Annual Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum served as a valuable opportunity for NATO PA delegates to learn about U.S. priorities on defence and security, while also reaffirming the importance of transatlantic relations and dialogue between North America and Europe. Given the importance to Canada of both the U.S. and transatlantic relations, the meeting offered Canadian delegates the opportunities to advance Canadian interests and participate in current discussions on a wide range of issues, including the war in Ukraine.

Respectfully submitted,

Julie Dzerowicz, M.P.
Chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association

Travel Costs

ASSOCIATION	Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association
ACTIVITY	22nd Annual Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum
DESTINATION	Washington D.C., United States
DATES	From December 5 to 7, 2022
DELEGATION	
SENATE	Hon. Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu Hon. Donna Dasko
HOUSE OF COMMONS	Ms. Julie Dzerowicz Mr. Charlie Angus Ms. Christine Normandin
STAFF	Andrés León, Association Advisor
TRANSPORTATION	7,297.76 \$
ACCOMMODATION	7,879.07 \$
HOSPITALITY	0,00 \$
PER DIEMS	2,494.56 \$
OFFICIAL GIFTS	0,00 \$
MISCELLANEOUS	1,302.44 \$
TOTAL	18,973.83 \$